It is a tautology that the famous incompleteness results in mathematics and computer science are the result of the axioms of arithmetic used to derive them. Would Gödel be able to derive his incompleteness result without Peano's axiomatisation of arithmetic? Not really. Arithmetic is axiomatic and our axioms of it are arbitrary and ad hoc. Because they're axioms. Who says aliens would come up with the same ones?
There are huge assumptions made in this thread that only indicate the brief time that the contributors have given to thinking about all this stuff. If you think about it for a couple of minutes, sure, it all feels very natural. Zero, infinity, division, mathematical logic, set theory, etc. But if you think about it a bit more, and then do a bit more than think, and go read about it, it's obvious that those are just the ideas that we chose to go with, not the only ones that exist, and certainly not the only ones proposed by mathematicians, logicians, computer scientists and philosophers over the years. For instance, Hilbert was a finitarian, division doesn't work with zero, zero doesn't work with division, dividing an infinity multiplies it, material implication leads to counter-intuitiveness paradoxes, set theory with only the membership relation leads to paradoxes, etc etc etc. Mathematics is full of unnatural holes that need constant patching up, and there is nothing to say that it is in any way, shape or form "real", let alone universal as so many people in this thread seem to be saying.
In any case, any model which includes infinity (and Peano arithmetic already does) is pure convention and unconsciously assumes a lot of things.
Finitary induction may make sense as something "universal". Further than that, we are making things up as we go (and I am a professional mathematician). The fact that they work to solve real problems does not make them more real.