You accept Google and Apple might deny you access but then you just blithely assume the US Federal Government (for example) would never do so, which shouldn't pass the laugh test.
I can imagine it being valuable if my government wants to help get me back in to, say, my bank accounts if I somehow lost all my credentials (e.g. my home burned down suddenly but I somehow escaped with nothing). But I don't feel like my GitHub, Gmail, Patreon, etc. make sense in this context. If my friends can lose a phone every year or two and make a new god-damn account, I think "My home burned down and I have nothing" is a good enough reason.
Gitlab's attitude of (for unpaid accounts): Too bad, just make another one - seems appropriate for almost everything. If tialaramex never wrote another HN comment, and instead tlrmx or tialaramex2 or whatever began posting, who would even care ?
HN participants, for whatever reason, approach these challenges as “but this isn’t a problem I have.” You’re the builder, but there are far more citizens (hundreds of millions at least) who are simply consumers of these systems. Passkeys are rolling out internet wide to all sorts of critical services people rely on, and they’ll need a solution if they lose their passkey.
I wouldn't want escrow of private keys, however. I'd rather the USPS just act as a certification authority that provides strong guarantees of identity verification.
https://www.uspsoig.gov/document/role-postal-service-identit...
> The Postal Service Reform Act of 2022 has recently expanded the Postal Service’s ability to provide identity verification to all levels of government. A window of opportunity is currently open for USPS to contribute to closing gaps in government identity verification processes.
[1] just one, recent example... https://www.al.com/news/2022/10/alabama-gop-chairman-made-th...
My bank is already regulated and required to have strong identity verification for some operations. They won't let use any sensible multi-factor authentication, however. Requiring they use such a government mandated authentication infrastructure would be a major "win" for my piece-of-mind.
You are correct that a Passkey ecosystem has an inherent risk of being locked out of cloud storage / sync, and that a third party escrow system is a mitigation against that. But it's not sufficient. You'd end up with keys that could, at best, only be imported into authenticators of the same ecosystem you were denied access from which, as Sync Fabrics are not interoperable. This is presumably not the outcome you're looking for.
I believe some sort of mechanism to assert credential strength at presentation time rather than generation time, and/or some sort of mechanism for TPMs/Secure Elements/Secure Enclaves to establish trust and import trusted credentials from a different authenticator vendor would be needed. This would allow vendors that don't control the hardware (i.e. are not Apple/Google/Microsoft) to build something like a "1Passkey" without having to implement their authenticators in software (i.e. a Virtual Authenticator), and you could keep your wrapped passkey store in escrow with any third party of your choosing.
Of course, one doesn’t need to utilize this, but you’re SOL without a recovery mechanism of last resort (unless individual sites and services have their own recovery processes to re-provision a user who no longer has access to their cryptographic credentials).