Re:The Google plasma globe affair of 2012
by duped on Monday October 10, 2022 @07:28PM
(#33157589)
How do you distinguish between a new keyboard and a bad USB cable that gets wiggled a bit?
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Re:The Google plasma globe affair of 2012
by smegger001 on Monday October 10, 2022 @07:39PM
(#33157673)
check the Device ID, if its the same as the one that was in the port a second ago it the same.
Re:The Google plasma globe affair of 2012
by MisterTea on Monday October 10, 2022 @07:50PM
(#33157768)
What about spoofing?
An attacker can lie about what their device id is
Re:The Google plasma globe affair of 2012
by Scoundreller on Monday October 10, 2022 @09:41PM
(#33158492)
How would it know the right device id to spoof? (Definitely doable in a MITM scenario, but more complicated in others).
Pick one of the most popular keyboards used by your target and reuse it. That's how I'd do it. It's not going to get everyone but I think it's a legitimate approach.
The alternative methods looking at the time between keystrokes seems more reliable.
Re:The Google plasma globe affair of 2012
by yencabulator on Tuesday October 11, 2022 @02:38PM
(#33167290)
Keystroke delay based heuristic is just naive, all that means is that the attack needs to happen on an idle system.
In an ideal world, vendors would actually populate the serial number field with a number that's at least semi-random.
On this computer, only the USB-C HDMI adapter and the fingerprint reader have a serial number that looks random :-(