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Re:Iran’s Internet Shutdown Hides a Deadly Crackdown by bink on Sunday September 25, 2022 @05:01PM (#32976182)
IANAL, but how are Instagram and WhatsApp allowed to operate in Iran? Do embargoes not apply to online services?

I'd love to see companies such as Google and Apple implement optional mesh networking as an over-the-air update to their phones in order to help people communicate during times like this.

Re:Iran’s Internet Shutdown Hides a Deadly Crackdown by tpmx on Sunday September 25, 2022 @05:07PM (#32976242)
> IANAL, but how are Instagram and WhatsApp allowed to operate in Iran? Do embargoes not apply to online services?

That's a pretty good point, actually.

> I'd love to see companies such as Google and Apple implement optional mesh networking as an over-the-air update to their phones in order to help people communicate during times like this.

The tech isn't really there yet. It's both a hardware (BT doesn't reach far enough) and a software problem.

You don't just "casually" implement a global mesh-based network without a careful and quite explicit system design involving HW and SW in tandem.

Nevermind the largest problem: How do you prioritize traffic in a distributed, fair and and scalable way, on nodes that you can't trust, once the mesh network gets really popular?

Re:Iran’s Internet Shutdown Hides a Deadly Crackdown by djbusby on Sunday September 25, 2022 @05:29PM (#32976475)
Maybe ad-hoc WiFi stuff? Or can you ad-hoc see other hardware attached to the same "cell" as you?
Re:Iran’s Internet Shutdown Hides a Deadly Crackdown by retcore on Sunday September 25, 2022 @07:08PM (#32977362)
I'd have suggested illicit piggy backing the SMS broadcast SS7 signal channel, like the original WhatsApp did.
Re:Iran’s Internet Shutdown Hides a Deadly Crackdown by A4ET8a8uTh0 on Sunday September 25, 2022 @05:09PM (#32976259)
In general, sanctions are notoriously complicated ( sometimes with seemingly -- or actually -- contradictory notes ). And just to complicate it even further, it uses a system of waivers ( licenses ), which allow you to ask OFAC to engage in some ( usually explicitly listed ) of the otherwise prohibited activity. Due to their size and reach, it is not unlikely that both entities secured such a license.

Naturally, there is a compliance cost that they incur as a result, but I am sure there is an interest in US government to keep those lines of communications open for one reason or another.

Re:Iran’s Internet Shutdown Hides a Deadly Crackdown by bink on Sunday September 25, 2022 @05:13PM (#32976315)
Ah, it looks like you're right. A google for "ofac iran instagram" returns: https://therecord.media/us-treasury-carves-out-iran-sanction...
Re:Iran’s Internet Shutdown Hides a Deadly Crackdown by toast0 on Sunday September 25, 2022 @05:31PM (#32976493)
There's a general license for personal communications services in sanctioned countries. There's no required user payments, although phone number verification necessarily involves payments to the destination telephone company.
Re:Iran’s Internet Shutdown Hides a Deadly Crackdown by MonkeyMalarky on Sunday September 25, 2022 @07:37PM (#32977622)
>Google

Something I noticed once is that in AdWords geo-targeting, Iran is missing. Does that mean Google search is totally not available in Iran? Alternatively, if google search is available, are there any ads displayed?