Not all SCI compartments are codeworded, some just have names or acronyms (e.g. HCS - HUMINT CONTROL SYSTEM [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensitive_Compartmented_Informa...)
As a Govt leader, rather than a working-class flub DOD employee, Ellsberg was probably referring to various SAP access that Kissinger was about to be read into. SCI is just one SAP (well, most people consider it as such, but the IC seems to disagree for legal basis reasons). This article is actually pretty good for once:
Thus, there are likely many clearances/compartments that a great many people don't know exist or don't exist. I suspect there isn't really anyone who knows what every compartment is.
Edit: the corollary is, "how many people have access to everything?" or alternatively, "if the president doesn't, does anyone have access to everything?"
There are many things the President probably does not have unfettered access to.
There are many, many, many trainings and shit you go through that reinforce that seniority and superiority do not in themselves constitute the 'need to know' for classified information.
There should NOT be someone who has access to everything, as the entire point of the compartmentalization is that no one breach can be used against everybody/everything. I have a suspicion that there are actually compartments which are mutually exclusive - if you're in Compartment X, you are, by definition, not allowed in Compartment Y, specifically for that segmentation reason.
One is plausible deniability: there's no need to expose the president personally to every misdeed everyone working for the government may have committed. Yes, that's a cynical, realpolitik type of answer that really pisses off people on HN, but it's true.
The other is simply that the President makes decisions at such a high level that low level information simply isn't helpful to him. The federal government is huge. The President can't function without hundreds of people who spend all day aggregating and summarizing information. This invests a lot of power in the aggregators and summarizers.
Unless the process is completely decentralized, there must be someone approving new compartments. They probably know at least a little about each one.
The ability to create new Special Access Programs is usually delegated to the level in an organization that actually does this routinely; definitely below Department level, above Combatant Command level.
On the Army side, check out AR 380-381, and legally, 32cfr159a. Basically someone more operational creates it, and then gets approval from above, but the authority to create the program is closer to the action than the ability to finance it.
They deconflict on names at one level, usually per department (e.g. Army, Navy). I think this is done by pre-assigning names in batches to be used. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CIA_cryptonym is an interesting article.
This is, I believe, one of the reasons that intelligence sharing between agencies and the armed forces is so difficult. Some intel is compartmentalized in places that are inaccessible to another branch or agency, and changing the classification level or compartment of information is an extraordinarily inconvenient process.
The upside of this, however, is that we really do have a secure system for information
Basically, imagine trying to do library science without being able to know what information you're managing. The classifications created would quickly become senseless and incoherent.