http://www.samefacts.com/2002/12/secrecy-in-government/shhhh...
[quote]
When I was young and irresponsible, I worked for the Justice Department, analyzing drug policy. In that capacity, I was put through the full security mumbo-jumbo and received a Top Secret clearance and, on top of that, clearances for various very highly taboo Codeword categories.... Having been cleared, what did I learn that it would then have been a felony for me to reveal? Nothing that would have helped the Russkis or the narco-bad-guys. But I did learn the names of assorted corrupt high-level officials in various of the Carribean banking havens Jeff MacNelly once lampooned as “Rinky-Dink and Tabasco.” No elaborate spying had been required to learn the names; apparently it was routine cafe gossip in the countries involved. So why, I asked, is this material classified? Not that I had any desire to reveal it, but I was curious.
The senior security guy in the Criminal Division set me straight: Yes, everyone knew that the Rinky-Dink-and-Tabascanese Finance Minister, or Central Bank president, or whatever it was, was crookeder than a dog’s hind leg. He knew, we knew, the Prime Minister knew, the Prime Minister knew we knew, we knew he knew we knew, ad infinitum. Maybe the Rinky-Dink-and-Tabascanese voters didn’t know; that was their lookout.
But it was our policy to make nice to Rinky-Dink and Tabasco (honest, I forget which contrylet we were talking about). If it were revealed publicly that the US Government had knowledge that Mr. So-and-so was on the take, that would embarrass the Rinky-Dink-and-Tabascanese government, thus impeding U.S. foreign policy. Ergo, properly classified.
[unquote]
It generalizes my original point better than I did: with classified material, the secrecy is always because of the how, not the what.
But I regard that as a symptom of over-classification, and speaks directly to the "fifteen or twenty" clearances Kissinger was about to get that were above a Top Secret.
Ultimately, there's only a few "national security" secrets, but there's mega boatloads of career-ending blunders, minor and major wastes of time and money, graft and corruption. Over-classification and compartmentalization solves all of those problems by covering them up.
It's about compartmentalization - a guy who works intel in Iraq doesn't need to know about North Korean intel collection techniques, so it's classified differently and compartmentalized.
You may not need to know about the data collected in another compartment/agency but it would be useful to at least know how they are collecting data because you can then refine your own techniques.
Imagine that North Koreans promised $2m to the Korean Intel Dept. employee to reveal their secrets. If the secrets and methodology is the same and shared as he Iraq Intel methodology that one person can cripple our the whole intelligence apparatus worldwide.
What the government doesn't want is people going out to a club and getting hammered and then telling a bunch of strangers that you have a clearance because it makes you a target in a situation where you are already vulnerable.
The funny thing is, a clearance doesn't give you a need to know. From my experience the overwhelming majority of people with a Top Secret clearance don't have access to anything that is even remotely interesting.
Each SCI compartment and SAP has its own unique rules about what you can and cannot reveal (some SCI compartments mere existence is classified at the SCI level itself, meaning you can't say you hold that clearance to anyone who doesn't hold that clearance, for example).
Each SCI compartment also comes with it's own unique rules about when you can or cannot talk about what you learned or were cleared to access (most are probably lifetime NDAs).
That said, it's pretty shitty opsec to tell someone, or the Interwebs, that you hold a specific clearance or do a specific job.
I assume that there's a secondary signal that can be disclosed that everyone who has clearance can recognize?
Yes, the security structure can seem a bit artificial at times, like: - During cleared professionals-only job fairs. - Leaving a cleared job and all of a sudden there are no reporting requirements or security procedures. It's as if the gov't refuses to acknowledge that sensitive info is still in your head.
When I was leaving the agency I worked for, I had to get what I wanted to write on my resume approved. They told me I had to remove my clearance level.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensitive_Compartmented_Informa...
Sorry, could you explain this? I can't seem to put this together.
Not all SCI compartments are codeworded, some just have names or acronyms (e.g. HCS - HUMINT CONTROL SYSTEM [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensitive_Compartmented_Informa...)
As a Govt leader, rather than a working-class flub DOD employee, Ellsberg was probably referring to various SAP access that Kissinger was about to be read into. SCI is just one SAP (well, most people consider it as such, but the IC seems to disagree for legal basis reasons). This article is actually pretty good for once:
Thus, there are likely many clearances/compartments that a great many people don't know exist or don't exist. I suspect there isn't really anyone who knows what every compartment is.
Edit: the corollary is, "how many people have access to everything?" or alternatively, "if the president doesn't, does anyone have access to everything?"
There are many things the President probably does not have unfettered access to.
There are many, many, many trainings and shit you go through that reinforce that seniority and superiority do not in themselves constitute the 'need to know' for classified information.
There should NOT be someone who has access to everything, as the entire point of the compartmentalization is that no one breach can be used against everybody/everything. I have a suspicion that there are actually compartments which are mutually exclusive - if you're in Compartment X, you are, by definition, not allowed in Compartment Y, specifically for that segmentation reason.
One is plausible deniability: there's no need to expose the president personally to every misdeed everyone working for the government may have committed. Yes, that's a cynical, realpolitik type of answer that really pisses off people on HN, but it's true.
The other is simply that the President makes decisions at such a high level that low level information simply isn't helpful to him. The federal government is huge. The President can't function without hundreds of people who spend all day aggregating and summarizing information. This invests a lot of power in the aggregators and summarizers.
Unless the process is completely decentralized, there must be someone approving new compartments. They probably know at least a little about each one.
The ability to create new Special Access Programs is usually delegated to the level in an organization that actually does this routinely; definitely below Department level, above Combatant Command level.
On the Army side, check out AR 380-381, and legally, 32cfr159a. Basically someone more operational creates it, and then gets approval from above, but the authority to create the program is closer to the action than the ability to finance it.
They deconflict on names at one level, usually per department (e.g. Army, Navy). I think this is done by pre-assigning names in batches to be used. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CIA_cryptonym is an interesting article.
This is, I believe, one of the reasons that intelligence sharing between agencies and the armed forces is so difficult. Some intel is compartmentalized in places that are inaccessible to another branch or agency, and changing the classification level or compartment of information is an extraordinarily inconvenient process.
The upside of this, however, is that we really do have a secure system for information
Basically, imagine trying to do library science without being able to know what information you're managing. The classifications created would quickly become senseless and incoherent.
What most people don't realize about classified information is that it's not the information itself that's so sensitive; it's the means via which such information is acquired that must be protected. If this were not so, targets could simply sidestep our intelligence collection vectors.
I rarely dealt with any classified information that was interesting or surprising. It's mostly stuff you would expect. The technologies and methods used to acquire a piece of intelligence were always more interesting than the intelligence itself.