Like, if I have the MD5 hash of a binary from a trusted source, I can basically rely on that, unless the attacker was involved in producing the trusted binary. In which case I'd usually have bigger concerns.
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-01001-9_...
As Schneier writes as an introduction in the very paragraph you are trying to quote, "in academic cryptography, the rules are relaxed considerably." This is not a snub on academia; colloquial terms sometimes just mean something different than the academic definition.
"Breaking a cipher simply means finding a weakness in the cipher that can be exploited with a complexity less than brute-force."
But please go on about how you know more than Schneier.
Schneier is illustrating the gap between the academic and practical meanings of "broken".
Again: finding something that hashes to an arbitrary MD5 sum is still not known to be feasible. This isn't a particularly good reason to use MD5, but this also means that MD5 is not broken in the way you think it is.
When somebody finds something that hashes to all zeroes you can finally say that MD5 is completely broken. It is not known to be at that point yet.