I really don't think moving our trust to unknown, unnamed manufacturers of hardware in far away places is a solution.
The solution is not going to be high tech, imho. Just like we have learned a skepticism resulting from Photoshop, we'll learn a skepticism of live video or audio.
I happen to agree with the other voices here saying this is a folly game of cat and mouse, but there are near-time methods of making this harder to fool. And that might be enough for now.
If you care about the identity of who you are speaking to remotely, the only solution is to cryptographically verify the other end, which just requires plain old key distribution and verification. It's just not widespread enough today for videocalls because up to now, there wasn't much need for this.
This doesn't prevent adversarial impersonation (where you cannot trust the party that want themselves impersonated). E.g., if you are an employer, and interviewing via video, you cannot tell that the person authenticated and performing on video is indeed the person you're hiring. I dont think this is a problem that _should_ be solved tbh.
You can't make it impossible, but you can make it very difficult.
My elderly uncle almost gave $10,000 to a scammer who had convinced him that his nephew was sitting in a jail and needed this money to be paid for his bail. Luckily, he reached out to me for help and I was able to confirm that his nephew was at home, not in jail.
I honestly can't imagine some of the scams that are coming, particularly to the tech-vulnerable, if we don't do SOMETHING to make real-time deepfake video harder than it now is.
Nothing has really changed with deepfake, other than the fact that for a brief period we could be sure the person we were having a video chat with was legit because the tech didn't exist to fake it.
1. Robust to AI improvements.
2. Blocks all kinds of faking and tampering, not just deepfakes.
3. With a bit of work can securely timestamp the video such that it can become evidence useful for dispute resolution.
4. Also applies to audio.
5. Works in the static/offline scenario where you just get a video file and have to check it.
There are probably other advantages too. The way to do such things has been known about for a long time. The issue is not any missing pieces of tech but simply building a consensus amongst hardware vendors that there's actual market demand for [deep]fake-proof IO.
In reality, deepfakes have been around for some years now but have there been any reports of actual real world attacks using them? Not sure, I didn't hear of any but maybe there's been one or two. Problem is, that's not enough to sustain a market. Attacks have to become pretty common before it's worth throwing anything more than cheap heuristics at it.