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Re:An efficient key recovery attack on SIDH by dhx on Saturday July 30, 2022 @02:02PM (#32288876)
From the paper:

  "on a single core, the appended Magma code breaks the Microsoft SIKE challenges $IKEp182 and $IKEp217 in about 4 minutes and 6 minutes, respectively. A run on the SIKEp434 parameters, previously believed to meet NIST’s quantum security level 1, took about 62 minutes, again on a single core. We also ran the code on random instances of SIKEp503 (level 2), SIKEp610 (level 3) and SIKEp751 (level 5), which took about 2h19m, 8h15m and 20h37m, respectively."
Security level 1 is meant to provide security equivalent to where AES-128 is used today, security level 3 being AES-192 and security level 5 being AES-256.[1]

If the paper is correct, it would be a brutal knockout of the Microsoft team[2] from NIST PQC round 4 leaving just Kyber (selected in round 3) and potentially one or more of BIKE, Classic McEliece and HQC that have gone into round 4 as selected PKE/KEM schemes.

[1] https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Presentations/Let-s-Get-Rea... (page 16)

[2] https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/project/sike/

Re:An efficient key recovery attack on SIDH by brohee on Saturday July 30, 2022 @04:22PM (#32289938)
It's over AFAIK, announcement here https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2022/07/nist-announces... and CloudFlare blog here https://blog.cloudflare.com/nist-post-quantum-surprise/.

I wonder if NIST got advance notice or if SIKE was excluded on other ground, but in any case it wasn't standardized. The fact SIKE went to round 4 means that NIST likely ignored the attack...

Re:An efficient key recovery attack on SIDH by tptacek on Sunday July 31, 2022 @02:08AM (#32293589)
There's another phase of the NIST event.
Re:An efficient key recovery attack on SIDH by dogeprotocol on Sunday July 31, 2022 @01:08PM (#32296958)
This paper was posted only yesterday, 3 weeks after NIST announcement.