http://venturebeat.com/2011/10/11/benefit-corporations-calif...
So was that unnecessary? Could such behavior be compatible with the standard corporate model?
There's a reasonable argument to be made that's already the case, and the opposing idea – that 'maximizing profits' or 'maximizing shareholder value' is a legal requirement – is just a persistent misunderstanding.
I think such a misunderstanding is fed by some on both the right and left. On the right, some want to celebrate a singular, elegant rule for moving all decisions into an economic model. On the left, some want to smear the very idea of corporations as amoral at the core.
Neither view respects the idea of a corporation as a voluntarist coordination mechanism. A corporation is its shareholders' property, and just like any other property, may be deployed in any legal manner the owners see fit.
Similarly, the second case typically cited—Revlon v. Mac- Andrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., is also legally irrelevent. In Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court held that an end-game situation where the directors of a publicly traded firm had decided to sell the company with a controlling shareholder—in effect, terminating the corporation’s existence as a public firm—the board had a duty to maximize shareholder wealth.
But subsequent Delaware cases have made it clear that if the directors of the firm decide not to sell at all, or prefer to do a stock-for-stock exchange with another public company, the infamous Revlon doctrine no longer applies.
For example, in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court upheld directors’ right to “just say no” to a hostile offer, even though the offer was at a premium over the market price for the company’s stock.
Source http://www.directorship.com/stout-shareholders-as-owners/