If I call the getrandom system call, and it succeeds, I am (pretty much) guaranteed that the results are properly random no matter what state my userspace program might be in.
With vDSO, it seems we lose this critical guarantee. If a memory corruption occurs, or my process’s memory contents can be disclosed somehow (easier to do against a userspace process than against the kernel!), I don’t have truly random numbers anymore. Using a superficially similar API to the system call for this seems like a really bad idea.
Yea, that's definitely a downside of sorts. Jeffrey Walton mentioned that in the glibc discussion a few days ago: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/CAH8yC8n2FM9uXimT71Ej0m...
A mitigating factor might be that if your process memory leaks, then the secrets generated leak anyway, no matter what generated them, so maybe not as large of a difference. But of course a generator leaking means future secrets potentially leak too. I suppose frequent reseeds could mitigate this, just as they do for potential leaks in the kernel.
But anyway, I agree that compromising application memory is somewhat more possible than compromising kernel memory, though both obviously happen.
Silly mistakes like the Debian randomness bug come to mind - a program can be totally well-behaved even in the face of a glaring entropy failure, in a way that’s hard for developers to detect.
The article mentions this case too. getrandom() on my system seems to return the required amount of random bits to perform a shuffle of a deck in less time than my clock seems to have precision for; … that's … too slow?
As the post says, it's worth entertaining the idea of having the kernel provide a blessed way for userspace to do that, though I admit I've never personally seen a scenario where RNG was truly the bottleneck. But it'd still be nice to kill all the custom RNGs out there.