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Re:Linux RNG RFC Patch: implement getrandom() in vDSO by nneonneo on Friday July 29, 2022 @01:43PM (#32279834)
I guess my concern is with “silent” memory corruption, e.g. someone putting in a “bzero(state, …)” by accident and winding up with deterministic randomness. Sure, they could also just as well do a “bzero(randombuf, …)” before using it but that’s much easier to detect (and in my head, somewhat harder to do by accident).

Silly mistakes like the Debian randomness bug come to mind - a program can be totally well-behaved even in the face of a glaring entropy failure, in a way that’s hard for developers to detect.

Re:Linux RNG RFC Patch: implement getrandom() in vDSO by saagarjha on Friday July 29, 2022 @02:29PM (#32280284)
I guess? I mean, I see "something overflowed on the stack and into my randomness buffer" as being similarly common and about as undetectable. That's not to say we shouldn't invest in making APIs that are harder to misuse even if you hold them incorrectly, but I'm not sure the benefits are very compelling here.