How is that? Let's say I go to PornHub and purchase premium (which is only purchasable with crypto). Assume tor usage to not have to worry about any kind of side channel identity leak. How could PornHub know who I am? At most, if the person who sold me the crypto face to face messed up and the address he used to send me the coins becomes identified, PornHub could assume
A) This is another address of his
or
B) This is the address of someone he conducted business with
Either way you would need to personally inquire him to leak my identity, in case he even knows it.
And this is assuming a trivial case without the use of mixers and so on.
Ideally you would want your wallet software to automatically handle all this stuff, and automatically clean your coins for you, generate new addresses, etc without you even knowing.
I do not have the time or expertise to explain all the ways in which blockchain forensics is able to trace identities and ownership, but behold, it's an entire industry now. And isn't that much different from other forms of forensic accounting, which has been tracing money through labyrinths of shell companies and offshore accounts for decades.
If you believe, "Well, I used a new address! And a mixer! I'm safe!", that entire industry would like to have words with you.
How much can you tell us about the sender and recipient, please?
This like someone pointing out that there are doctors who can cure a mild infection and then demanding that person heal your infection immediately.
> It's only "anonymous until use". If you transfer some amount to me, I can then retroactively find its source, and likely find a good deal of information about you and the other wallets you've used.
Regardless, obviously you can't. And no forensic accountant can either. I think you're just misinformed. You can draw some unreliable statistical relationships between adresses but that's it. And schemes like CoinJoin makes that sort of analysis even more irrelevant.
If by industry, you mean blockchain analysis software vendors, I'm well aware of them. It is snake oil meant to tick an AML checkbox and appear as though you are doing something to fight money laundering. It's pure security theater.
Regarding law enforcement, they can't simply link Bitcoin addresses to real identities. It's just not possible. What happens is that some criminals are dumb enough to volunteer their real identity to exchanges and get caught that way.
It's only "anonymous until use". If you transfer some amount to me, I can then retroactively find its source, and likely find a good deal of information about you and the other wallets you've used.
This is fairly rudimentary forensics work, and an unmaskable, centralized store of all transactions makes it trivial.
> I don't see the point here?
"Anti-censorship" properties that are worthless in real-world usage seem to be a fairly important flaw if we're talking about a technologies anti-censorship properties.