Edit: the above is written from the viewpoint of the past myself, before emigration to the Philippines.
I've used many other solutions (including WireGuard, etc.) on and off, but always come back to SSH.
At the height of the pandemic I travelled to Denmark for work (on a clinical trial) and had a UK negative covid test to report to the UK government that I hadn't got around to – whose website geo-blocks people reporting covid tests from outside a UK IP address (even if, e.g. you'd just left it and wanted to report a negative test taken the day before). A SOCKS proxy was detected and I got a "we cannot verify you are in the UK" message. A wireguard VPN worked fine.
[1] https://incolumitas.com/2021/03/13/tcp-ip-fingerprinting-for...
That's the problem. Not all of them will implement tunneling their own traffic through SOCKS, and there's still other things like DNS that you might also want to go through the tunnel, but can't easily do so. A VPN sits at a lower layer, just looking like a regular network connection, so applications don't need to be aware.
I just want to point out the simplest solution which for some reason doesn't seem to be very popular, although it covers most users' use-cases better than a VPN connection does (IMHO).
Don't know about other browsers, but Firefox is able to send DNS requests through socks, whether you're using DNS-over-HTTPS or not.
SSH is very simple and there’s almost nothing a SSH tunnel can’t do.
You cannot disguise your SSH traffic mimicking HTTPS traffic which help you to bypass DPI solutions.. so its easy to block/filter/log your traffic or even pinpoint you in an adverse environment.
References:
[1] https://www.reddit.com/r/WireGuard/comments/ajv0eq/wireguard...
If the only thing a web server could do is differentiate tunnel from direct IP connection with or without firewall/NAT, which are ubiquitous, it's an interesting effort, but a tour de force with little gain IMO.
Personally, I chose to generate a domain list for V2Ray from the Russian government’s blocklist when I lived there [1].
I prefer to do that typically because it avoids the pain of the ever-growing whitelists and it allows me to keep the traffic encrypted in case someone does actually figure out that you’ve bypassed DPI. And if you use something like V2Ray or ShadowSocks, they’ll disguise the traffic much better than something like OpenVPN typically would, making it less obvious to anyone monitoring that you’re using a proxy in the first place.
There’s a load of references and pre-generated lists for different needs if anyone else is interested in doing something similar [2].
(Also, I hope this doesn’t come across as missing the point of the tool — I think it’s really useful and a good solution. I just figured I’d note some others too)
The newest issue are unlisted filtering performed on so-called TSPU DPI boxes. Two years ago we had only ISP DPI boxes, but now there's a government TSPU black box which they control themselves and block the websites/VPNs/SSH/IP ranges out-of-the-registry.
Interesting, though. I had heard talks about introducing proper government-level filtering -- I think after the Telegram/AWS/etc blocks in, like, 2018 (?), but I wasn't aware of anything actually going into effect.
If you've got time to answer or link me anything, I am a little curious. How are the TSPU boxes setup? Are these provided by the government to different datacenters/IXs or at some sort of higher level than that? And are they currently just used to filter additional out-of-registry domains/IP addresses or do they also filter the semi-public, known blacklist? Is there anything like the unofficial Chinese gfwlist that tries to maintain a list of the out-of-registry stuff?
I haven't lived in Russia in a little while now, but when I was last there, although virtually every residential ISP enforced the government list, a number of the domestic server providers weren't, so a good option for low-latency and keeping a Russian IP address was just renting a gigabit VPS from the city next to me and using it as a proxy server.
>How are the TSPU boxes setup? Are these provided by the government to different datacenters/IXs or at some sort of higher level than that?
They are provided by the government and should be installed topologically close to the client, before CGNAT. This is a modified RDP.RU EcoFilter, and currently are required to be installed only on residential connections, not in DCs/IXes. ISPs do not have any configuration access, and it's prohibited to route traffic not via the boxes. The abbreviation TSPU means Technical Measures to Combat Threats, and these boxes are capable of collecting, saving and centralized sharing of NetFlow data, but currently are almost always used only for blocking, however the general idea is to centrally control BGP flows and collect SNMP data from other ISP routers.
The company which controls the boxes is called Center of Public Network Monitoring and Control (ЦМУ ССОП, Центр мониторинга и управления сетью связи общего пользования).
>do they also filter the semi-public, known blacklist?
Yes, they do. I suppose the idea is to replace filtering DPI boxes which were installed on the ISP network all these years with this one. Right now most ISPs have both TSPU and one of commercial DPI systems.
More information in English from Alexander Isavnin on RIPE: https://ripe83.ripe.net/archives/video/630/
So in addition to using such lists with one of the ISPs, I tried to detect signs of non-prevented blockage using iptables (matching on stuff like unusually-high TTL of an RST packet, or a string that occurs in the SSL certificate that they try to use for MITM - yes, they were not even consistent, or maybe there were two layers of DPI), and add the addresses learned this way to an ipset, so that next time they are routed through a VPN.
On the other ISP at a different location, just dropping all packets with ID=0 was for some time enough to avoid the censorship.
The only time this doesn’t apply is if someone controls your computer or the destination website and is able to MITM your TLS traffic. Is that what has happened?
Your HTTPS headers are not visible to anyone. So, for example, why is GoodbyDPI modifying the Host header? This is inside the end-to-end TLS encrypted connection that your ISP can’t see, and that the destination web host can’t see.
(Depending on yourISP and provider this can be a good trade-off)
The ops topics are full of people claiming how critically important it is for them to sniff through everything you do on "their" network for security.
You don't need to go to Russia, China or India to have your privacy violated. Just go to work.
Hence I've recently been asked to implement a URL inspecting firewall, which implies a HTTPS intercepting MiTM proxy. They will probably require some exception list where things get passed through 'unmolested', but for a white listed sub-set of sites (say well known health, banking, etc).
The one thing which can break that is cert pinning, but then the corporations can simply mandate that apps requiring/using cert pinning not be used from the corporate machines.
There are some bumps in the techniques caused by HTTPS RRs, AltSvc and HTTP/3, but they will be worked around, at worst by forced downgrades.
The "they'll never no argument" carries no weight, as employers up front tend to inform their employees that the communications are monitored, hence giving the corporation legal cover.
That said, I do generally agree with the aim of that article, but changing the corporate mindset is a different (non technical) problem; it is all about providing the corporation with a colorable argument towards reducing their liability in certain scenarios.
Public VPNs act as a mixer and hide your tracks. IP correlation is very easy nowadays, so persistent single connection to your own VPN won’t protect you from certain entities that correlate your traffic.
DoH is better than DNS but it doesn’t provide privacy. You should switch to DNSCrypt.
But then you are losing the anonymizing effect of the VPN. If you are doing something illegal this is obviously bad but I guess it otherwise doesn't really matter. Companies like Mullvad have tens of thousands of users which means that the actions of one VPN IP address can not be attributed to just one person. You're just transferring the ability to surveil you from your ISP to whoever hosts your VPN server.
Can you please share an easy way to do that?
I’m usually not afraid of wading through configuration swamps, but when it comes to openvpn, I curl up in a corner crying.
This tool is great, but I religiously route all my traffic through a VPN that I own and control. I’ve hardened the box I use to have zero logs and I don’t need to blindly trust a commercial provider whether they’ve been audited or not. There’s no way of really knowing they’re not logging in some capacity bar from being physically in their server room and inspecting their setup.
Add to the VPN a DoH resolver that I own and control too, and it makes things even better. I also block port 80 on my machine as an extra measure. No need to be using port 80 in this day and age except for captive portals which I rarely ever have to use.