The problem with that is that the logic is broken. If 99.99% of phishing can be prevented this way, what problem do you have with it? Would you really catch that 0.01% that an automated system wouldn't?

You mean you don't verify calls to action via other information channels? Fairly regularly I get phishing emails that correctly spoof the crypto headers of major sites (e.g., because of a misconfigured mail service). If an email asks me to do something, it either doesn't get done or I cover my ass in as many ways as possible, no exceptions.

That isn't by itself an argument against a good automated system -- I definitely like not having to sift through most of that garbage, but catching the 0.01% should be a routine practice, not something that seems like an insurmountable burden.

Maybe you should implement a "feature" that serves a simple static HTML page <p>This webpage is safe.</p> to "bingbot" and serve the real page to everyone else.

I believe the recommended practice is to hover over the URL before clicking the link.

If you do so, in Outlook, there will be a pop that shows "Original URL: XXX". This allows users to make a determination for themselves whether the link is safe or not.

We got some security courses about that too. Unfortunately, outlook replaces all of them with some safelink url rewriting, so the only way left to find out if a link is scammy is clicking it.

It is in fact possible to extract a destination URL from a Safelink one without clicking it. For the full link this can be tedious, but identifying the domain can still be done quickly.

For normal URLs, I agree. But in this case you have adversarial urls. Suppose the scammer puts some http and www.google.com in the url parameters, after some randomly generated 8 characters dot someobscuretld site.

I don't trust myself enough to be 100% sure I can decode an URLencoded misleading mess perfectly all the time.

They already hid urls in the username of the url, like www.google.com.unholymessherethatscrollsoutoftheurlbar @ malignantdomainnotgoogle.blah

Scammy Microsoft.

Microsoft offers this as a security product. It's impossible to know all links but known ones can be blocked to limit future issues. Other enterprise email security products scan the links and follow all the redirects as well. After delivery a incredibly small amount of time and every link is "clicked" in an email with those products.

Cool, so we should just stop building and running almost anything in existence because it's not all-encompassing? That sounds like a suboptimal path forward.