OK let's backup.
What would it mean to say that "qualia are reducible to a symbolic representation" if they cannot be expressed by language ?
It seems to me that language includes all possible symbolic representations. Can you give an example of a symbolic representation that is not expressible by language ?
We are aware of our own thoughts through processing a mental model of ourselves, this mental model of ourselves includes introspection on our experiences, while we are having those experiences. That's qualia. A static symbolic state would be the equivalent of a memory of experiencing qualia.
Well, that's just materialism.
Do you or do you not accept that it is possible for a materialist to hold the view that qualia are not produced solely by computation but that some non-abstract physical process is required ?
Because that is the position that the OP is taking and your original comment appeared to dispute it.
The point is that computation is abstract, it requires you to pick some physical system but it doesn't care which one, the result is the same regardless.
If a non-abstract physical system is required it means that the actual hardware matters. You can't swap it out for another system and expect the same results.
For example I could imagine some kind of computer that computes using water and there happens to be a program which when run on that hardware sprays you with water, hence making you wet. But if instead you run that same program compiled for some non-water based architecture then running it won't make you wet.
Neither does anyone else but the point is that once you accept that such "non-computational elements" might be or must be required you are no longer talking about computation alone being sufficient to produce consciousness.
As far as I can tell it would have to be some physical process that affects the behaviour of a computational system, but isn't computational and it's effects on other systems cannot be simulated by computation. Does any such a phenomenon exist in all of physics? Not that I'm aware.
I mean no physical process is strictly computational. Computations operate on abstract representations of physical things, not on those things themselves. We're back to why weather simulations don't rain on you and why simulations of nuclear explosions don't leave craters in Los Alamos.
I suppose the representation might be of an abstract object, data, but you can't actually operate on anything that's only abstract. It has to have a real representation.
Computation is not a physical process any more than addition is a physical process. It is true that to actually perform either a physical instantiation is necessary but in the same way that the results of addition do not depend on what we are adding the results of computation do not depend on what kind of physical process we use to perform the computation.
This was the whole point of my earlier water based computer example. Would it be correct, on the basis of that example, to say that the program "makes you wet" or that some computations make you wet ? No, such a statement would be as non-sensical as the statement that 5 + 5 = 30 pounds.
Now the key thing is that when people make claims about computers being conscious those claims are usually based on what some program does (ie. what its inputs and outputs are), in other words a computational property of the program that would be the same regardless of what kind of computer it was executed on. The guy who claimed that LaMDA was conscious wasn't basing his claim on something specific about the kind of hardware it was running on, he was basing it on the program's inputs and outputs, which are indeed a computational property and therefore abstract.
That's all I'm saying. When you say 'computation is not a physical process', I think that's an ambiguous statement. The actual computation of something must be physically performed for it to occur, otherwise no computation takes place.
>The guy who claimed that LaMDA was conscious wasn't basing his claim on something specific about the kind of hardware it was running on, he was basing it on the program's inputs and outputs, which are indeed a computational property and therefore abstract.
The kind of hardware doesn't matter, absolutely, but there must be hardware. You can't say that an abstract object such as a hypothetical computer program, or even an actual computer program that is stored but not running, is conscious. In order to be conscious, it would have to actually run. Consciousness, like the actual process of computation, is not an abstract property. It must be an instantiated property (I would prefer to say an instantiated behaviour) of a real system.
I think we can agree inputs are not conscious, nor are outputs, nor are both put together. What he was doing was inferring something, from those inputs and outputs, about the process that occurred in an actual computer to produce one from the other. That process is not abstract, it's a physical process. When it's physically happening there is (or might be hypothetically in the case of LaMDA) consciousness, when it's not happening there isn't.
What you are suggesting would be like saying that there's some property of addition that is not mathematical (because hopefully we agree that mathematics only studies abstract properties) but that you can only learn about by looking at all the different kinds of things that one can concretely apply addition to.
I would argue that such a thing is implausible. It would be completely unlike anything that anyone has seen in the real world.
One thing I think we do agree on is that conscious experiences are not abstract (very unlike the other person I've been exchanging comments with who denies that they even exist at all). Beyond that I argue that computation itself is entirely abstract and though I don't seem to be able to get you to admit that, I think most people, certainly most computer scientists would admit it readily.
So what we're left with is a claim that an abstract process can produce something that is not abstract and such claims are just not plausible. That would be exactly like a computer simulation of the weather producing actual water.
Ok, that makes sense, sure.
>...because hopefully we agree that mathematics only studies abstract properties...
I can't agree, performing a calculation isn't an abstract concept, it's a physical process. It does map to abstract concepts though.
>Beyond that I argue that computation itself is entirely abstract and though I don't seem to be able to get you to admit that, I think most people, certainly most computer scientists would admit it readily.
That is not the case. The fact that computation is fundamentally a physical process is a core principle of several branches of physics and computer science:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computation https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rspa.2014.018...
Computers aren't abstract, they're real objects doing things in the real world. If the thing they are physically doing is not computation, what is it?
>So what we're left with is a claim that an abstract process can produce something that is not abstract and such claims are just not plausible. That would be exactly like a computer simulation of the weather producing actual water.
Abstractions cannot affect the real world, sure, so if computation is purely abstract how come your computer can display my message on your physical screen right now? How is that happening, if not by computation?
You're really tangling yourself up in knots with this view of abstraction. You can map what happens in a computer against abstract concepts and abstract objects yes. You can also map operations in several different physical systems against the same abstract objects. That's what it means when we say computation is implementation independent. But it still needs to be implemented to actually happen.
Previously you said this:
>Computation is not a physical process any more than addition is a physical process. It is true that to actually perform either a physical instantiation is necessary...
So it's not a physical process, but you can instantiate it. And it's purely abstract so can't affect the physical world. Yet here we are using computers.
I'm lost, frankly.
I will say one more thing however:
I never said that abstractions cannot affect the physical world, I said that they cannot produce non-abstract things. A computation can affect the physical world by modulating the flow of electrons (which already existed, they were not created by the computation) to an output device, such as a screen that will display something you can see. But everything described in that last sentence isn't part of the abstract computation itself, it's a side-effect when the computation is run on a particular type of hardware. If instead you ran the same program using a human computer, as Alan Turing suggested in his well known paper on the halting problem, which largely created the field of computer science, then the result would not be displayed on a screen but instead perhaps written on a piece of paper. Nonetheless it's the same computation that was run in both cases. That's why computation is intrinsically abstract by nature.
It's not computing anything. What he's saying is that, by random chance, some pattern of flipping states in the medium might coincidentally correspond to a computer executing a program. Therefore if consciousness is a program, such a pattern could be considered conscious. This is just the Bolzmann's Brain proposition, cf wikipedia. It doesn't prove or refute anything.
>If qualia were reducible to a symbolic representation then there should be some linguistic utterance which would cause you to experience the sensation of the pain of burning your finger on the stove.
Why do you assume that verbal signals can induce any possible change in symbolic state in a brain? I see no reason to assume or accept that. I can't induce any possible arbitrary change in the internal state of a Switch running MarioKart by mashing on it's control buttons either. There are simply limits to the way it processes it's inputs. Same with humans.
If the pain of burning a finger is reducible to symbolic representation by states in a brain, and if we could induce such states artificially such as by using electrodes, then in principle that would produce a sensation indistinguishable from burning your finger. Yes, I believe this is so.