A competing account of consciousness is that the capacity for subjective experience pervades material reality (essentially it is what it's like to be some part of the universe; i.e. there is always something you could call a "qualia field" present in the "interiors" of things, which could be simple or complex depending on which part of the universe we're talking about, e.g. a rock vs. a brain).

In this account, the reason it appears unique to humans is simply that they're the only parts of the universe we're in contact with which are able to talk about it.

If that's correct, then the capacity for subjective experience is equally possible for a computer—it just needs to have its "pattern of behavior" arranged (i.e. programmed) in such a way that it does things like thinking, self-reflection, goal-formation, and verbalizing.

If you believe what enables those things in human brains is due the abstract functional relations expressed through neurons, it's probably the "abstract functional relation" part that's more significant than the neural substrate, and it could likely be equivalently expressed in silicon.

The difficulty in considering subjective experience/consciousness to be unique to humans is accounting for how/when it manifests in us, since we appear to be comprised of ordinary molecules. The opposing account I give is founded on the idea that subjectivity cannot be created by arranging molecules in particular ways, so it must have already been there. Neither stance is perfectly founded imo.

I didn't say it's unique to humans (I don't think it is) but rather that I don't think it's in my laptop. I don't know if it could be in silicon or not, I just don't have any reason to think it is at this point.

I don't see why the right arrangement of ordinary molecules can't result in consciousness. I just don't think the arrangement of a computer executing a set of instructions in its registers is such an arrangement.

That's fair. I guess the way I think about it, "a computer executing a set of instructions in its registers" is general enough to cover any arrangement of silicon that would be potentially interesting. But now that you mention it, the set of arrangements which aren't (essentially) isomorphic to a turing machine, and yet exhibit rich interesting behaviors, possibly resembling things like conceptualization or natural language ability—would be very interesting to consider, though it seems unclear at this point whether we'll ever find an example.

> I don't see why the right arrangement of ordinary molecules can't result in consciousness.

This is covered by the "hard problem" of consciousness. It is hard because it appears to be by definition something incapable of expression through ordinary physical relations.

I think the hard problem is primarily why we have consciousness, and why it evolved versus us just being automatons controlled by our brains, more so than the physical mechanism by which it is implemented, though I sometimes see it presented as both.

Thankfully we don't need to solve the hard problem to say that computers don't have it. But I don't see why consciousness is "by definition something incapable of expression through ordinary physical relations". What definitionally makes consciousness prohibited by the physical world?

> What definitionally makes consciousness prohibited by the physical world?

"consciousness" is too broad a term—I only mean to refer to the aspect of it dealt with in "the hard problem".

The hard problem deals with the existence of subjectivity itself. All other aspects of consciousness, e.g. "self-awareness" can at least in principle by thought of as producible by some type of system architecture (in the case of self-awareness, the system needs at least two layers, the upper one operating on data which represents the state of the lower one—i.e. it operates on a model of self; a vast simplification, but maybe it clarifies a bit).

But when you try to do the same thing with the existence of subjectivity itself, it doesn't really make sense. It isn't any kind of "system," it's not even a behavior, not something with any kind of state evolving over time, not reducible to separate parts, etc.

The "by definition" part is most clear if you think of subjectivity as "the field of qualia present at any moment"—a concept also sometimes referred to as "immediate experience". Thinking of subjectivity in terms of a qualia field which is "immediately present" to consciousness (i.e. there is no mediation; it is in fact the only thing we're immediately in contact with as conscious subjects), it's easier to see specifically why it has the characteristics listed above which make it not producible by any kind of "system," and all the things we can do by re-arranging physical materials, e.g. molecules, can be described through the concept of a system (something with parts and relations between them and some kind of consistency in behavior).

> Consciousness is the subjective experience of "being like something"

I absolutely detest that definition of consciousness. It just moves the fuzziness from the word "consciousness" to the phrase "being like something". It means absolutely nothing. Figuring out what the subjective experience of a model is like is about as unquantifiable as it gets.

I think it's pretty clear but alright.

Degenerated into waffle. There’s no reason to believe that humans are more than some chemistry running on squishy meat. It seems like it would be physically possible to emulate that with silicon and software. There’s are no concrete definitions of sentience, thinking, so I guess you can shift the goal post whenever you want.

I gave a definition - having a subjective experience aka self-awareness.

What is that?

Acting on an internal state?

Aware you have an internal state and can adjust it internally? Why cant some code do that?

You seem to be misunderstanding me. I'm not saying it is prohibited by the laws of the universe for a computer to have sentience. I'm saying there is no good reason to believe that our current computers, no matter how many instructions per second they are able to execute or how sophisticated the programs they run are, are sentient. Saying "why can't a computer do x" is not an argument that a computer does currently do x.

But no, consciousness is not just "acting on an internal state". A toaster acts on an internal state. It is a complex phenomenon in which an internal state, and the environment interact to create an internal state and a subjective experience of that state which is felt by the organism.

This will go down a rabbit hole, and I don't want to engage in a discussion about what consciousness and feelings are, but there is not reason to believe that computers have feelings. And the output of computer language models is not good evidence that they have feelings, particularly those which are trained on the language models of creatures which have feelings (humans). If they were trained on the language of birds, we wouldn't say there's evidence they are afraid of dogs, even if they were to engage in loud chirping when presented with a dog.

Can you prove you to us have one ?

No, but that's irrelevant to the question at hand.

Yes, this would be the 'meat is magic' argument: That there's something mystical that enables biochemical systems to do 'consciousness' in a way that mere silicon+software can't.

I certainly understand that some people think this. I just don't understand what basis anyone has for believing it with certainty.

No it isn't. I did not appeal to biochemical matter in my explanation whatsoever. The question is why the laptop doesn't but add more silicon and software and somehow it does. I would need a reason to think that line has been crossed.