The use case here is just "advanced encryption at rest". Encrypting at rest is one thing, but this means people are less likely to see PII by accident, for example.
"Queryable Encryption implements a fast, searchable scheme that allows the server to process queries on fully encrypted data, without knowing anything about the data. The data and the query itself remain encrypted at all times on the server."
They are strongly implying that the someone with access to the database should not be able to decrypt the data. According to their blog post that seems to be the entire value proposition compared to what they describe as traditional encryption at rest.
Designing secure cryptosystems is hard. Experts fail at it all the time. The lack of technical details is a major red flag.
Not to mention the distinct possibility that even if this group made a secure system, the mongodb marketing dept may very well be misrepresenting its security/limitations.
So let me get this right - its encrypted but you cansearch prefix and suffix?
So all the attacker has to do is do it one letter at a time, see if it starts with A, B, C, once they figure that out, go to the next letter and so on. (I presume that the DB is not supposed to be trusted since they make such a big fuss about only being decryptable on the client side)
Also there doesn't seem to be a whitepaper detailing algorithms or their threat model. Bitcoin scams try harder then this.