The security of these tokens is still MFA as an end-to-end security model, insofar as you need a something-you-know [password, passcode] to unlock the device that serves as your something-you-have. So someone who just steals the device, can't use it to authenticate as you. (See also: smart cards having PINs.)

And, once again, companies doing MFA properly, enforce MDM policies on such devices, such that they either don't allow you to use the convenience biometric unlock features, or they limit them to ~1 minute before you must unlock with a something-you-know factor again.

(I worked for IBM for a year-or-so a while back; they required this even for phones not serving as MFA authenticators, because they had a threat model that included attackers cloning your fingerprint just to snoop company secrets out of the emails on your phone.)