> As a backup, you either have some kind of spare keys in safe storage or reliable access to someone who can restore your access after having identified you.
I have two Yubikeys, but I don't consider the second one as "spare" that has to be locked away. I carry one USB-C/NFC key on my key chain. The other is a USB-A Yubikey nano, which is always at home in my desktop's monitor USB port so I can reach it very easily. By using both regularly, I'm more likely notice if one key gets broken or lost.
> * in some case you could generate the key beforehand on a computer, and then load it on a stick (unsure about yubikeys though). You should still revoke your key anyway once your stick is lost - as you should assume it could be found and used, sometimes needing only a touch operation rather than a PIN.
You can do that with yubikeys. You can copy the same secrets to a different key or store them somewhere safe. I considered doing this, but in the end all services that I use allowed to add two keys which seems like the better option. My reasoning was that if I have two identical keys A/B and I loose key A, I would have to immediately invalidate key B too - but before I can do that I would need to:
1. get a replacement key C 2. setup new secrets for key C and store them 3. then log into every service to add the key C and remove key A/B 4. reset key B to use the same secrets as key B
Up until point 3 (which my take a while until I get key C, unless I would always have a third key lying around) all accounts are vulnerable. On the other hand if I have two separate keys with different secrets, I can just remove the lost key from all services and deal with the replacement key later.
yeah, this is the way to do it. worrying about losing keys is a valid concern for webauthn where some poorly-configured services might only let you enrol a single key, but we've (mostly) got ssh figured out by now and everything lets you use multiple keys. so register and use multiple keys on a regular basis.
There was (is?) a vulnerability in Google Titan keys (and some Yubico products as well) that allowed cloning of keys (having a physical access is a pre-requisite).
Also the Yubikey NEO that was impacted by this is pretty old, released in 2012 I believe.
> 1. The impacted Yubico Yubikey Neo is an old product no more available for sale. All FIDO U2F Yubico Yubikeys currently available on their webstore are based on a newer secure element from Infineon, and are not impacted by our work to our knowledge.
Let me store my key in a secure, offline, physical device... and extract to clone it when my yubikey is worryingly old.
My threat model does not include physical attacks, but storage of a key on-device or in backups? Or forgetting a password for an encrypted archive? yep.
But more generally, this is a protocol issue. You can’t enroll your Yubikey with your browser and then, later, have your browser enroll that key with a WebAuthn-using site. You have to put the key in your USB port at the time you enroll with a website. And you can’t do this if it’s in a safe.
It kind of goes without saying that losing the key results in you getting locked out - if there was any other way there wouldn't really be much of a point to the complication of making yourself dependent on a stick.
As a backup, you either have some kind of spare keys in safe storage or reliable access to someone who can restore your access after having identified you.
* in some case you could generate the key beforehand on a computer, and then load it on a stick (unsure about yubikeys though). You should still revoke your key anyway once your stick is lost - as you should assume it could be found and used, sometimes needing only a touch operation rather than a PIN.