Re:Tor anonymizing network Compromised by French researchers
by lallysingh on Monday October 24, 2011 @02:49PM
(#3150969)
Looking at the linked article:
'The specific attack involves creating a virus and using it to
infect such vulnerable systems in a laboratory environment, and
thus decrypting traffic passing through them again via an unknown,
unmentioned mechanism. Finally, traffic is redirected towards
infected nodes by essentially performing a denial of service on
clean systems.
Researchers showed that one third of the nodes are vulnerable,
"sufficient in all cases so that we can easily infect and obtain
system privileges," says the director.'
While the theory of the network is pretty good, you still have to execute your normal bread & butter security practices. Sadly, the anonymization depends on others doing the same.
The majority of the research seems to indicate that if an attacker can control 1/3 of the relays in the tor network he can influence its operation and decrypt/associate/identify traffic streams. The tor threat model has always stated that an attacker with control over a significant number of nodes could successfully compromise the security goals of the network. Furthermore the attack depends on users not utilizing trusted entry nodes. I do not think the attack would have any effect on a user who used a trusted entry node that the attacker did not control.
[1] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/strategies-getting-more-bri...