Breaking with metaphor, I don't consider it much of a security flaw if step one is the other person has to have physical access to the device.

I can't see why you can't make an iPad everything-but-screwdriver-proof.

Okay, let's say it's now true. So if you forget your lock screen password, that's it, you're SOL. You bring it to the Genius bar at an Apple store. They inform you that you're SOL and you'll need to pay $600 for a new one. Yes, this would happen, so it's a terrible idea.

Okay, so relent a little, and let the people at the Genius bar send a special override command that enables them to unlock the device. This would be special in the sense that you couldn't do this at home with iTunes.

But eventually someone would reverse engineer what, exactly, that special command is, and then regular users would be able to unlock devices on their own. We're no longer everything-but-screwdriver-proof, but we're more secure than before.

My question: is it worth it? I don't think so. We're still in a situation where this is only going to be a concern when you lose your device - either because you left it somewhere or it was stolen. But we've now introduced lots of potential headaches for the user, for very little practical gain.

But let's assume it doesn't leak. Is it worth it? Consider the enormous cost that would be required for this: every new iPad that is manufactured would need to be recorded in this central database. Secure access to it needs to be set up and maintained from all Apple stores around the world. Is that worth it for a rarely needed feature that most people don't care about?

If you instead try to do a secure hash of, say, the serial number, that's much less cost to maintain, but that hash will almost certainly leak. (Think DeCSS.)

It isn't that I oppose viewing this as a "bug" (obviously the user is led to believe that a password in and of itself would prevent this), but I would think that anyone security-conscious enough to have a password should be disabling smart cover unlocking anyway...

This is typical of Apple, though: it is also fun to carry around an Apple Remote if you know people with MacBooks. You walk up behind them, hit the menu button, and yell "FRONT ROW!", at which point their computer (default setting: accept any random remote) will /slowly/ fade to black, and then /slowly/ fade into a TV-like UI the user has probably never seen before.

It's /more/ fun to walk around with a defcon 2008 badge hacked to mash the "menu" button ten times a second rolling through the different pairing codes :)

That being said, just disable the unlock with smart cover and problem solved.

An insecure default shouldn't be excused because you can change it - the default configuration should be secure against such an attack.

So in order to avoid this bug you would have to own a smartcover (or magnet) and hold it up to the sensor (it’s on the right side of the device) in order to display the option in the settings and only then could you turn it off.

1. What bigger problems do I have to worry about?

2. The iPad uses encryption just like the iPhone. Most people won't be able to defeat that encryption, but most people will be able to do this simple on/off hack.

Sure, but the decryption keys are also on the iDevice, otherwise it wouldn't work. Which means that a competent cracker can get access to your data. Not a big issue if all you have is personal stuff (but then, how bad is it if your personal data is compromised), but the gains for bug business espionage could justify the expense of a crack... So yes, the battle is already lost if an attacker physically has your iDevice in their hands. Don't do that.

Still, the default setting for the smart cover is clearly a bad security error by Apple - I trust it will be quickly fixed.

> The attacker has physical access to your device ... you have bigger problems to worry about.

I don't have bigger problems to worry about (or maybe I do - what are they?)

Perhaps 1% of thieves can get at my encrypted data, but probably all of them will be able to perform the few steps necessary to bypass the lock screen.

Uh, no I didn't ;)

Look, the thing is, if you're worried about a casual thief, they probably don't care about your data anyway, they're going to wipe the device clean and resell it. If it is someone that actually stole the device to get the data, then I would expect your '1%' (plucked out of the air, or is there a reference for this kind of statistic - honest question, I'm not snarking) is actually going to be a much higher number, in which case the encryption isn't going to save you. It's pretty much game over once the attacker has their hands on the physical device, afterwards it's just a question of time.

Most theft is going to be opportunist. For most thefts my data is going to be protected by the encryption. So in most cases, I don't have anything bigger to worry about.

A more sensible way to encrypt a device is to use a separate long code that only has to be typed in at boot. Using a screen lock as an encryption key is just not effective.

Previously, physical access meant someone broke in or fraudulently gained entry to a room where your pc/server lives. Nowadays it means someone grabbed your tablet/smartphone for a minute while you are in the bathroom.

Your e-mail is the key to your entire online (offline too?) identity.

I trust my friends but I wouldn't give all of them "me-level" access to my entire life.