EDIT: Regarding side-channel attacks, presumably fTPMs that have such vulnerabilities can be fixed. dTPMs can also get firmware updates, but I'm not sure that every dTPM side-channel vulnerability is fixable -- it might depend on the chip's hardware capabilities, though the STM one in the TPM-FAIL attack was fixed.
Microsoft seems to disagree with you.
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/iot-core/secure-you...
Firmware TPM (fTPM) requires special Processor/SoC support that is not currently implemented on Raspberry Pi 2 or 3. MinnowBoard Max needs firmware version 0.80 or higher. DragonBoard410c provides fTPM capabilities out of the box enabled by default.
Discrete TPM (dTPM) is considered the utmost trustworthy solution by all means
Software TPM (sTPM) is also referred to as TPM Simulator. It is platform-independent, supported on Windows IoT Core. sTPM is intended for development purposes only and does not provide any real security benefits.
Chips are just as vulnerable, but its currently harder and not impossible to hack them.
Another problem is that reading out a bitlocker key from the TPM after satisfying a policy is nice, but if it is not read over an encrypted session, then it can be read by any physical attacker than can watch the bus.
The fundamental problem, ultimately, is that in order to defeat the bus attacks, the BMC and BIOS and early OS boot stages need secure volatile storage for storing the TPM's resetCount, and long-term non-volatile storage for storing the public key of some primary on the TPM for keying encrypted sessions. An fTPM has no external bus to worry about. Ergo fTPMs are fine.
with bugs https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=tpm
https://tpm.fail/ https://github.com/VernamLab/TPM-Fail
The Bob Rudis bit explains TPM shouldnt be relied on. https://www.forbes.com/sites/daveywinder/2021/10/16/critical...