If they are not smart enough to keep malware off of what should be the most secure systems around, perhaps they shouldn't be building the fricking FLYING REMOTE-CONTROL DEATH MACHINES for a while, until they can figure out the basics.
Capisce, guys?
But you are glossing over a LOT of detail here. The military doesn't work like Apple: they don't design, oversee, or directly control the construction of the hardware they use. And they shouldn't - the government is woefully inefficient at building products, that's what corporations are good at.
Here's the situation:
- The Air Force contracts General Atomics Aeronautical Systems to build UAVs. You can bet your ass the contract covers things like "protected from malware"
- General Atomics contracts out the different components of the UAV. No device worth $150M gets built by one company alone. The radar, the metal shell, the inside components, and each component of the software are all made by different companies.
- Each component is meticulously specified and rigorously tested. The makers of a component is contractually liable if they fuck up, giving them an incentive to do it slow & right. That's why it's so damn expensive.
- General Atomics puts the pieces together into the final product and delivers it to the Air Force after another round of rigorous testing.
- A team of guys in the Air Force are trained on operating the UAVs to deploy on missions.
=====================
So to say something like "Ugh, military, don't deploy UAVs if you can't keep it virus free!" is an oversimplification. These are extremely complex machines, with highly specialized embedded software, meant to deliver explodey things with extreme precision, while being operated from very far away. You can't just slap Norton on these things and call it a day.
And if you think this little press release means anything to actual national security, you have much to learn about our secret war against terrorism.
they are just wined and dined by the contractor when they should be directly overseeing and controlling.
>And they shouldn't - the government is woefully inefficient at building products, that's what corporations are good at.
Starting at some architectural level, many DoD systems is a just one-off system, not a product.
There are actually very strict controls on how much government personnel are allowed to accept from contractors. IIRC, the limit is something like $20-$50 per year in gifts. When contractors host large events with catered lunches, they put out bowls or some other sort of receptacle so that government personnel can pay for their lunch, otherwise it would count towards that annual limit.
Enforcement at the level of "you didn't pay for that six-inch sub and can of coke" is not really practical, but quite a few government personnel have gone to jail in recent memory for accepting more lavish gifts from contractors.
Now, if you send your lobbyists to buy expensive meals for legislators (you know, the ones who actually decide how the money gets spent) and write them big checks, that's generally perfectly legal.
I suspect that under it all, you'll find an unpatched XP or even Win2000.
As far as I know, SSDs are not allowed, only magnetic drives.
http://gcn.com/articles/1998/07/13/software-glitches-leave-n...
And, have you seen all the computers necessary to carry out a drone operation? I guarantee you not all of them are running an RTOS. Probably not even all of them onboard the drone.
Of course. There is Windows NT for _that_ :
http://www.theragens.com/misc/MR%20-%20Windows%20NT%20Real-T...
No, you can't - you have to slap Symantec Critical System Protection on them. /Then/ you can call it a day.
They're handicapped by a need AND compulsion to use contractors for everything. Actual government employees didn't build drones; they were all developed and in many cases largely maintained and even operated by private contractors, working to government requirements (which themselves are structured to make the contractors inefficient, compared to normal commercial companies). Same thing with networks.
It's not that hard.
But anyway, my point was that I don't for a second believe that they're this incompetent, there must be other factors at play.
Let me remind you that this computer can fire missiles at people, and has a potentially unlimited budget.
The costs of good vs. bad IT security are actually not terribly significant in the context of the overall defense budget, either.
It's really a failure of process and vision, not resource constraint. Government IT and IT security used to lead industry; now consumers especially and even enterprises are more advanced than government.
eye roll
The thing which makes it hard is humans, politics, and economics -- there is a huge amount of CYA with respect to vendor choice (hence, they're a huge Microsoft/Cisco shop), lots of little fiefdoms, an "up or out" promotion policy combined with people being in leadership roles for short periods (with minimal prior background), and lack of real accountability.
The Microsoft-ness isn't enough to kill them on its own; look at the Israeli military, which is also heavily Microsoft based, and has world-class computer security.
If you have a good engineer or a great engineer but any kind of bureaucracy, yes, it's near impossible.
Use-after-free vulnerability in Microsoft Internet Explorer 6, 6 SP1, 7, and 8 on Windows 2000 SP4; Windows XP SP2 and SP3; Windows Server 2003 SP2; Windows Vista Gold, SP1, and SP2; Windows Server 2008 Gold, SP2, and R2; and Windows 7
http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-0...
"Microsoft thanks the following companies for working with us and for providing details of limited, targeted attacks against customers of Internet Explorer 6:
Google Inc. and MANDIANT; Adobe; McAfee; French government CSIRT (CERTA)"
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/MS10-00...
A requirement that all components of the TCB be FIPS 140-2 level 3+ for anything which is routinely used in combat operations would please me, I think. Right now that's just for the crypto modules themselves.
If it's good enough for the NHS, it's good enough for uncle sam.
That said, i'm not in charge of physical security of anything. I'm sure the guys with missile launching computers figure anybody that can get to the secure terminal is trustworthy.
have fun!
Sure, it's hard. But it's the fucking military. Figure it out.
Other countries hack US war machines with targeted virus: man, I couldda stopped that shit easy.
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/12/predator-dro...
Such as: they discovered and disabled the virus but are still sending fake info over the virus's communication channel and want the Chinese/Iran/whoever to think it is still working?
That sounds much better than a technically incompetent military with dangerous toys.
“We keep wiping it off, and it keeps coming back,” says a source familiar with the network infection, one of three that told Danger Room about the virus. “We think it’s benign. But we just don’t know.”
C'mon. You're the military. "It just keeps coming back?" So you decide to do a press release about it? Please.
I wouldn't have whined like that when I was de-malwareing neighbourhood PCs at age 13, I would have fixed it. If I can successfully keep malware off the PCs of middle aged parents with teenaged children, then the government capable of developing and operating fleets of unmanned military drones can certainly isolate a network and disable the USB bus.
There is definitely some high level shit going on right here. I doubt we'll know about it for many years, if ever.