Instead the best practice would be to tokenize the data, accept it through one channel (an AttachCard api or whatever) and then return to your api consumer another opaque token to use for actions like authorization or clearing. From here there you can ensure that tokens are never reused etc.
This way if tokens leak they should be “inert” and no actions should be able to be taken with them.
I think the article muddies the waters on this point because the the sentence defining tokens in the intro says they "are safe to expose".
In other contexts maybe you’re more accepting of public exposure. For example tokenization can be an effective GDPR mitigation, but i don’t think folks are particularly worried about reuse attacks when the information contains a name or email (I’m sure there are instances where they are concerned as well)
But at least when talking about tokenizing actionable information (credit card, bank account, whatever) implementors should be careful to keep them out of their public apis.
In this case, the tokenization is the measure itself.
I can't speak for every payments product but in the one I work with tokenized cards are tied to one merchant. A compromised token can only be used to process payments to that merchant.
Say you have wrapped a credit card number in a token. When a user buys something, you call the API to charge the CC token instead of a CC number. But if an attacker steals a token, they can make that same API call and charge a card to pay themselves.
I guess the mitigations tokens give you over bare CC numbers in that scenario are:
* The attacker probably needs your API key or similar to use along with the token, instead of having a bare CC they can easily use anywhere
* Better auditing of token use
* Tokens are revocable in case you discover a breach
Still, due to that risk I don't see how this "eliminates" compliance risk.