Just because the chance of a new pandemic is non-zero doesn't mean we should invite and encourage dangerous behavior that could trigger or quickly spread a strain to the point it turns into a pandemic.

Experimenting with deadly viruses in a major population center is like testing in production if your an AWS or Azure engineer. You might not care too much if it doesn't work, but your screwing over everyone else for your convenience if something does go wrong.

There is risk in doing lab based research. There are clear and obvious ways to mitigate that risk. The science is clear both of these.

Covid was a warning. But scientists are going to ignore that and the science? And we're going to make excuses for that?

What could go wrong?

Your response is a bit confusing, so I'm assuming what you mean is that you believe physically isolating high BSL labs in remote areas is a clear and obvious way to mitigate that risk? And that COVID was a warning that we should do more of that? And that scientists are ignoring that warning?

In which case, all of that is predicating on this actually being a lab leak.

But there is no "bury head in sand" option. Eventually something as transmissible and much more lethal is going to spread. At that point, it's too late. The reason SARS-CoV-2 had a vaccine a year later is because of previous work in exactly these sorts of facilities.

BSL labs are the safest places on the planet to work on dangerous pathogens. They aren't perfect. We should continually work to make them more perfect, and fund them to be so. But they're already multiple orders of magnitude more secure biologically than the alternates.

Any country on the planet can work with any dangerous pathogens they can get ahold of. In any way they want. You can only set standards, contribute foreign aid to fund improvement, and try to improve the safety level of the global community.

The "lab leak possibility means we shouldn't do lab research" argument feels like the suggestion that after Nagasaki the world should have abandoned nuclear weapons and ceased research.

In which case, we'd be living under the flag of whichever country ignored that and pursued it anyway.

Put a lab in a densely populated area vs a non densely populated area? I don't see what's confusing about that.

It isn't a ceteris paribus comparison, because we don't live in a society where you can force people of expertise to work where you would like them to.

They get to choose.

So you end up with the CDC in Atlanta or Ft. Detrick 50 miles away from Washington, DC. If you said "We're only going to do BSL-4 work at Enewetak," then a lot of work simply wouldn't get done, either because of logistical challenges or because no one wants to relocate there.

And on a personal note, as someone who's lived < 5 miles away from a BSL-4 lab, I slept like a baby. I knew that if the worst happened, from the environment outside the lab or the lab itself, the nearest ICU and associated institutions were staffed by some of the best infectious disease experts on the planet.

Not all pandemics are equal though. Whatever nature might throw at us, might not be as bad as a virus that has been purposefully designed to be deadly and highly contagious, through gain of function research.