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Re:How the weak can win – A primer on protracted war by int_19h on Thursday March 03, 2022 @10:29PM (#30550350)
The why it was possible in Chechnya is that the rebels have started fighting between themselves; specifically, the (older) Chechen traditionalist / nationalist faction was unhappy with the growing power of the (newer) Salafi fundamentalist faction.

Thus, Kadyrov - except back then it was Ahmad Kadyrov; Ramzan is his son and successor. As the Chief Mufti of Chechnya, he was one of the most powerful figures in the traditionalist camp, and one with the most to lose from Salafism gaining ground (traditional Chechen Islam is Sufi).

Ahmad Kadyrov was all in with the rebels during the first Chechen war, officially declaring it a jihad in his capacity as a mufti. Ramzan boasted of "killing his first Russian at 16" at the time. But by 1999, the Kadyrov clan decided that Salafis are more dangerous than Russians, and switched allegiance.

That is why Russia could install that puppet government relatively easily - because they had considerable local support: not just the Kadyrov clan, but numerous others aligned with it. Ukraine also has many potential collaborators, but mostly in the East, and they are already mostly in the separatist militias. I expect that Russia will recruit from those for its occupation administration.

Re:How the weak can win – A primer on protracted war by simonh on Thursday March 03, 2022 @11:03PM (#30550570)
There’s also the issue that Chechnya is about 2/3 the size of Donetsk, let alone comparing it to Ukraine as a whole.