I keep seeing this being repeated, but the state of nuclear deterrence is very different than during the Cuban missile crisis. The US, UK, France, and Russia all have enough nuclear-armed subs sitting just outside of enemy waters to destroy every major target on both sides. The US doesn’t have nuclear weapons in Poland, nor does it need them. Russia cannot stop thousands of ICBMs and hundreds of sub-launched closer range nukes, and neither can the US.

You are talking about the military aspects. The political aspects matter too, and sometimes much more than the military aspects. Do you think the US would be content to let Russia place missiles on Cuban soil today? Why is China cagey about the US deploying THAAD on South Korean soil?

Not sure if those were rhetorical questions but of course you’re certainly correct. The difference between those situations (at least Cuba) and the nuclear situation in Europe is that Moscow is already very much in striking distance of British and French nukes, and vice versa. Nobody wants the scary optics of accepting further encroachment of nuclear weapons closer to thei borders, even though it has less tactical value than it did 60 years ago.

>the timing of this is more related to Putin's political situation at home.

yes, as i already wrote during the last year, Ukraine got Turkish drones and with them the window of opportunity to win the Donbass war (like Azerbaijan/Turkey did against Armenia/Russia). The fall of Donbass would have been a large failure for Putin which his regime would have hard time to survive. Without bringing aviation though Russian forces couldn't operate successfully there (especially given the tank swallowing deep Spring mud what is going to happen in few weeks), and this is what happened yesterday across Ukraine - attacks on airfields and air-defenses, command and control centers, etc.

Yes, Russia has a finite window in which it can bring in its tanks and heavy artillery, which are its strengths, before the spring thaws mire them in the mud. It's not entirely clear what the endgame is here, though. They can not sustain an occupation, and they will suffer heavy casualties if they do a street-to-street urban war; they will face questions at home if heavy Russian casualties are incurred, which is entirely possible given the US and UK have armed the Ukrainians up the wazoo with antitank missiles; they can not sustain a 'fortress Russia' with $630 Billion in USD reserves indefinitely; and they certainly can not stop the long term turn towards NATO and away from Russian energy exports, which will get a jolt in the arm after this disastrous war.

> It's not entirely clear what the endgame is here

Fuck up Ukraine and go home. Belarus has already been turned into a puppet state, and if they manage to turn Ukraine into a similar puppet or at least a failed state, there will remain no prosperous alternative in Russian-speaking world to Putin's Russia.

Russians have massive inferiority complex since at least the 1960s when Soviet Union began to significantly fall behind the West and this is their way of dealing with it.