A random thief stealing my laptop would have to:
1) Bother
2) Break my hard disk encryption/know the password
3) Break my password manager encryption/know the password
I think that's hard enough for someone wanting to get into my email. I use a separate hardware key to secure my domains, and that's about it.
What's the attack vector you are protecting against that a good, non-reused password is not covering?
Still, when you've got access to your password manager (to get your password and TOTP token too), you've got access to a trusted device too.
And there is still an option for anyone (including shoulder surfers) to type in your password+token a bit faster than you so they get in: nobody bats an eyelid for getting reprompted for another TOTP token.
You are also vulnerable to someone stealing your password manager password in this manner, especially with a cloud one (which is what most businesses require).
As a conclusion, it does grant you some extra protection against using password only, but when on a separate device, it's really another dimension.
You are still protected from your password hash being stolen from the target website, decrypted and then used for log-in, but if password hashes were accessed, potentially a bunch of other stuff that you'd care about is too, so that's a somewhat moot point.
But someone stealing your laptop and getting access to your password manager gets access to your 2FA too. Making it not a "second" anything: it's akin to using two passwords for log in to a single site and keeping them in the same place. Physical separation of the two authentication factors, thus, matters.
That also means that you should not have your password manager on the phone, or at least only have a separate one: ideally, password managers would integrate between desktops and mobile devices to pass short-lived access to passwords for Oauth/OpenID Connect auth instead.
Yeah, bridging convenience and security is a long standing nightmare of a problem to solve. :)