Re:SSL broken. (TLS 1.0 cryptographic attack that works. ...
by asdfaoeu on Thursday September 22, 2011 @07:02AM
(#3025608)
I think you would need to have the last unknown character at the start of the next cipher block as you would need to control the content of the cipher block directly after that.
Re:SSL broken. (TLS 1.0 cryptographic attack that works. ...
by caf on Thursday September 22, 2011 @10:29AM
(#3026182)
The idea is that if you force the browser to produce the ciphertext of a block like "kie: sessionid=f", where the first 15 characters are already known, then you don't have to try many candidate plaintext blocks through your adaptive-chosen-plaintext oracle to find that unknown 16th character.
Re:SSL broken. (TLS 1.0 cryptographic attack that works. ...
by benmmurphy on Tuesday September 20, 2011 @04:30AM
(#3016805)
i think this is the original paper: http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/136
Surmising from this and the scant details released: It is a chosen-plaintext attack. Requests to the logged-in SSL site are made by injected Javascript in a separate non-SSL page. By changing the length of the requested URL (easily done by appending GET variables), the authentication cookie header is pushed out so that the first unknown character is right at the end of a cipher block. This allows us to make guesses at that character, testing each guess using the method described by Wei Dai in the linked email (using another crafted request to the server). Once we've found the first character, we push the cookie one byte further back and work on the second character, repeating until we have the entire unknown portion of the cookie.
If this turns out to be somewhat accurate, a workaround could be to have the browser force the HTTP headers to be block-aligned, by inserting a dummy first header if necessary.