Re:Two weeks later David Bennett is alive, his pig’s heart b...
by skissane on Wednesday January 26, 2022 @02:55AM
(#30082945)
> Idk, it could just be a claim that the argument can be expressed in a logical system, combined with the normative axiom that rational agents should only trust arguments that can be validly expressed in such a formal system.
The term "valid" has both formal and informal senses. I agree some of its formal senses are non-normative, but I think its informal uses have a strong normative element. The original comment to which I was responding wasn't very clear about in what sense it was intending the term, but when people aren't clear, it is not unfair to assume they mean a term informally rather than in some specific formal sense.
> Regardless this seems to be missing the forest for the trees. Nobody has put forth any arguments for either position that are emperical in nature. Is there really a practical difference between impossible and possible but nobody knows how?
What is the proper role of empiricism in human knowledge, including moral knowledge? You seem to be making some assumptions here which you are not making explicit.
If one accepts moral sense theory – that moral intuitions are a form of empirical knowledge – then we can have direct empirical knowledge of the truth or falsehood of moral propositions.
If one accepts pragmatism – that beliefs can be justified by the pragmatic benefits of believing them, and that pragmatically justified beliefs can constitute genuine cases of knowledge – then empirical evidence can be used to establish the pragmatic benefits of a moral belief, and hence (indirectly) to establish its truth.
One may believe that some axioms are self-evidently true, and that one's knowledge of the truth of those axioms is innate rather than empirical – in which case, if one accepts that for non-moral axioms, how about accepting it for moral axioms as well?
The term "valid" has both formal and informal senses. I agree some of its formal senses are non-normative, but I think its informal uses have a strong normative element. The original comment to which I was responding wasn't very clear about in what sense it was intending the term, but when people aren't clear, it is not unfair to assume they mean a term informally rather than in some specific formal sense.
> Regardless this seems to be missing the forest for the trees. Nobody has put forth any arguments for either position that are emperical in nature. Is there really a practical difference between impossible and possible but nobody knows how?
What is the proper role of empiricism in human knowledge, including moral knowledge? You seem to be making some assumptions here which you are not making explicit.
If one accepts moral sense theory – that moral intuitions are a form of empirical knowledge – then we can have direct empirical knowledge of the truth or falsehood of moral propositions.
If one accepts pragmatism – that beliefs can be justified by the pragmatic benefits of believing them, and that pragmatically justified beliefs can constitute genuine cases of knowledge – then empirical evidence can be used to establish the pragmatic benefits of a moral belief, and hence (indirectly) to establish its truth.
One may believe that some axioms are self-evidently true, and that one's knowledge of the truth of those axioms is innate rather than empirical – in which case, if one accepts that for non-moral axioms, how about accepting it for moral axioms as well?