You are assuming people are not arguing in good faith. That is, in itself, a kind of bad-faith arguing, suggesting that people who disagree with you simply don't understand and would change their minds if they did.
In good faith, and with understanding and acceptance of potential consequences, I will continue to say that using encryption is always responsible, the responsible use of encryption is "yes, always", and any two or more (or one or more) people have the right to keep communications exclusively and nigh-unbreakably between themselves. My answer to that will not change, regardless of the people communicating or the content of the communication. If you want the contents of that communication, get it from one of the people communicating.
> No one is arguing that we should remove E2EE between you and your bank.
Many people are arguing that; I've seen people say that it wouldn't matter for the purposes of securing financial transactions if the government has access.
By removing encryption you leave the connection open to man in the middle attacks. That is something neither side wants.
>securing financial transactions if the government has access
This is just adding another person (end) who can decrypt the message. It's still E2EE.
>You are assuming people are not arguing in good faith
They are at least arguing from a point of misunderstanding what the other side wants or what is possible to satisfy the other side's needs.
There exist plenty of people who think that allowing the government to decrypt messages between two people using a chat app when they have a warrant would require a plaintext copy of the message stored on the chat app's company's servers.
People regularly suggest breaking the encryption between you and your bank, not removing it. Breaking it is worse, because it lets people think they're getting the expected properties of encryption but they're not.
(Also, I get the impression that there's a certain subset of one side who would unthinkingly say "sure, remove it, if that's the price we'd have to pay to get rid of XYZ".)
In general, it's not societally feasible to have real encryption that's only usable for certain purposes, and fake encryption with backdoors that's usable for other purposes. There's no "special web" that's only used by banks and "important things", and that's a good thing. As far as I can tell, most of the people suggesting backdoored encryption are suggesting that banks and the rest of the web would use it too.
> This is just adding another person (end) who can decrypt the message. It's still E2EE.
You know exactly what people are expecting when they say "end to end encryption", and it is emphatically not that. If you'd like to argue in good faith, don't try to redefine terms other people are using in good faith, or make people use contract-level precision to define them adversarially. People should not have to explicitly say "end to end with only the ends that are mutually desired by both parties" and a dozen other caveats just to guard against such misinterpretations.
> They are at least arguing from a point of misunderstanding what the other side wants or what is possible to satisfy the other side's needs.
That's still giving too little credit to what you see as "the other side".
Even if there's no plaintext sitting around on a server, and even if the backdoor doesn't inevitably have its keys misused or stolen, and even if all the theoretically possible but unlikely things that proponents of backdoors would like to suggest are true, I am still arguing that people can and should use real encryption without backdoors, and have actually private communication as they see fit.
> what is possible to satisfy the other side's needs
It's appropriate to use any and all valid counterarguments to dismantle an argument at every layer, not just the weakest set of counterarguments that might possibly refute the other side. That includes the "this won't actually solve the problems you wish it would solve" considerations, and the practical implementation considerations, and the requirements-based considerations, all of which apply independently. All of those arguments are important, and different arguments may convince different people.
But it's absolutely possible to argue purely at a requirements level, in terms of what's possible to satisfy the other side's needs. That alone is sufficient to show that the two sides don't have common ground. It seems like the fundamental crux of the argument from "the other side" demands some form of backdoor mechanism that provides third-party access to otherwise private communications, and won't settle for anything less. Regardless of implementation considerations, and regardless of what you might think that would prevent, anything satisfying that property is unacceptable. If there something other than that, some lesser thing that does not compromise private communication and the use of real encryption, that would satisfy "the other side", then that'd be incredibly valuable to know, but I've seen no evidence of people on "the other side" accepting anything less, only evidence of people being talked out of this demand and people not yet talked out of this demand.
Conversely, I'm happy to get down to the crux of my own position, at a "what is possible" level: actual private communication, with no backdoors, no less than that will suffice. Private communication and real functioning encryption is a massive societal good. People arguing in good faith aren't ignoring the bad things the other side presents (apart from refuting whether backdoors would actually help), they're just saying "nope, even if that were true that doesn't outweigh the massive societal good".
Encrypted communications between humans should be a basic human right. You are arguing that it is not. That some contexts don’t deserve encryption. They all do, no exception. Nobody has the right to demand access to encrypted communications except the peers involved in the establishment of the channel.
The safety argument has and will always be a red herring to take fundamental rights away.
Personally I believe that it is worth considering as a society whether adding a mechanism for a message to also be decrypted by law enforcement if they have a warrant would be beneficial or not.
I am not saying that encryption should be removed. I am suggesting we use more cryptography to replicate what we had before, but with extra benefits like removing third parties from being able to easily see or tamper with your messages.
It was and never was about protecting people, it was always about controlling people. Reject the tyranny.
From Wikipedia: A backdoor is a typically covert method of bypassing normal authentication or encryption in a computer, product, embedded device, or its embodiment.
What I am suggesting could be a possibility would not be a secret (covert), nor would it be bypassing encryption. A mechanism for government access with a warrant would be a part of the public design of the system. A simple implementation would be to give all judges a hardware key that could decrypt a key. Chat clients could encrypt a key with the judges public key and have the chat app store it on a server. Law enforcement can access this encrypted key via a warrant and have a judge decrypt it. Now in the actual system you would want it to be more complicated such as being able to handle when a hardware key is stolen.
I personally don't have a strong opinion on this, but I do think it's worth discussing.
>How can I change your opinion on this?
If you wanted to win me over to your side you would need to explain what is so bad with reading someone's messages after getting a warrant. >99% of people won't have their messages read. The most likely reason someone would oppose this is that they would be revealing incriminating evidence. Personally, I don't support this reason as it lets us collect more evidence to ensure we are giving a proper judgment to someone. The next likely reason is people who are obsessed with privacy and couldn't stand that what they ate for dinner the other night could potentially also be revealed to law enforcement. I understand this is a valid concern, but personally I think it's a trade off worth making.
I’m from the privacy argument, and will except nothing less that complete confidentially between peers. Anything except this position I perceive as an attack and will defend my position with my life.
The other point is “nothing to hide”. Reality is we all have something to hide, and given enough scrutiny we all fall.
“If you give me six lines written by the hand of the most honest of men, I will find something in them which will hang him.” — Cardinal Richelieu
There can be no compromise in this argument. There are many jurisdictions on the planet that would love to use this back door to start rounding people up.
An real world example might be 2 gay men communicating in a private messenger about a rendezvous - somewhere that they are not accepted. Law of their land is that it is illegal. Your back door just cost them their lives.
You might live somewhere where law enforcement is not a risk to your life, but many do, and this kind of thinking leads to tyranny and death.
What is your definition of a back door. All of the common ones I see involve secrecy of it's existence.
>Reality is we all have something to hide, and given enough scrutiny we all fall.
I believe that if society is more understanding and accepting this will be less of a problem. With all of this information out there things could be normalized instead of forced to be secret.
>Law of their land is that it is illegal. Your back door just cost them their lives.
Personally, I believe that we should be trying to change laws, not helping people break the law. If it's illegal to be gay either stop it or accept the realization that you are going to die. My "back door" didn't cost me their lives, them breaking the law did.
Of course not everyone will agree with my point of view especially in extreme cases that relate to people being killed for breaking the law.
Enough.
If you have a bad conscience of neglecting your children, maybe start spending time with them instead of endangering secure communications. Most cases of child abuse isn't inflicted by strangers, even less so through the internet.
There is a measurable effect that mass surveillance has on many people and it already has a significant negative effect on trust towards state institutions. Self inflicted mostly.
No dialogue shall be had, encryption is a technology that is available to all. Maybe we should restrict governments because they have to provide transparency.
No one is arguing that we should remove E2EE between you and your bank. With cryptographic systems we can choose what parties can see the plain text. For different situations the people who should be able to decrypt and the requirements needed to be able to decrypt may be different. I feel like this is a challenging discussion to have because there's people on both sides who lack information / knowledge leading them to make poor arguments.