But DNSSEC 2.0 is unlikely to happen, because DoH solves most of the real-world on-the-wire problems with DNS security. There have always been two visions for how to secure the DNS: the top-down way, with signatures rolling down from the roots, a la DNSSEC, and the bottom-up way, where leaf servers allow individual clients to make secure queries, and we gradually converge on a secure DNS as more and more leafs make secure queries available. Top-down won at the IETF, but bottom-up is going to win the market.
It may turn out that DNSSEC is useful, for exactly one thing: downloading the root zone securely. This circumvents any refusal to do signing-on-the-server by the root zone server operators.
Here are the instructions: https://localroot.isi.edu/
The author themselves states in a different post on their blog that DNSSEC is avoided like the plague because it is a royal pain in the ass to set up and outages at major corporations (coughSlackcough) that clearly have talented, knowledgeable, experienced ops people show that the standard was not designed with practical implementation in mind.
"Security that is difficult to implement and can cause catastrophic-level outages not used by majority of internet; film at 11."
Instead of lecturing everyone on how they should be using DNSSEC, what we should be doing is working on "DNSSEC 2.0", from lessons learned in the 2-3 decades people have been trying to use DNSSEC.