And, well, you may well have never heard of attacks that would be mitigated by these technologies, but I have. Firmware-based attacks have existed for over a decade, and the Hacking Team leak included a firmware implant targeted at some ThinkPads. Do I think most users need to worry about this? No, I don't, and I don't know that there's enough people who do need to worry about this that it should be the default (I have thoughts on this, I'll write them up later this evening). But to deny that some people do need to worry about this is just inaccurate.
And Microsoft has required secure boot and TPMs on all certified client systems since Windows 8.1. Almost all shipped hardware already has all this functionality. If Microsoft had any interest in being evil here, they've had the opportunity to do so for years.
Anyway! Even if you can't replace the firmware, the secure boot database is in an unprotected variable store, so you can just replace it even if PSB is enabled. You're welcome.
This is a pure cash grab by Lenovo and AMD, not about mitigating attacks.
If this were about platform security for the benefit of the owner, it would not be permanent, nor enabled by default. All this does is create more e-waste and nuke resale value for Lenovo systems and Ryzen CPUs.
Lenovo has been increasingly slimy for years now (I guess everyone forgets that they've been caught distributing spyware in their products multiple times?) and this is just yet another stop on the road.
I hope Lenovo and AMD both get their asses sued.
If it's not permanent then it doesn't work - any plausible mechanism for allowing it to be disabled can be triggered by whoever's replacing your firmware (which makes AMD's approach somewhat bewildering here, given that you can just replace the CPU). But yes, I agree that enabling it by default is probably the wrong approach here.
This is a real argument. While it might make sense for cloud computing for the client to verify system integrity, malware that modifies firmware is not the largest blip on the radar in these times. A good protection is actually the numerous different manufacturers.
I agree, these technologies aren't primarily for security, they are to enforce how devices are used.
> If you're a journalist or an activist dealing with governments that have a track record of targeting people like you, it should probably be part of your threat model.
But considering what we know about the NSA, at least Intel's Management Engine is likely backdoored. So any anti-USA journalist/activist has probably to worry about that too. And an even bigger threat is industrial and diplomatic espionage of non-USA companies and countries using these processors.
(Also could be extrapolated to other countries' secret agencies for potential Huawei, Russian processors, if those ever get popular, like Huawei's control over EU's telecommunications.)
There are situations where that kind of security is required, of course, but they are not something that you should worry about if you use the computer to watch YouTube videos and thus I don't think that makes any sense at all to be present on a consumer PC.
Especially if you extend features like remote attestation, it is more about user control than user security.
Even with a fully encrypted disk with LUKS, someone could replace your boot manager with a tool to capture your encryption key.
For most people this will be a non issue: the cost of such an attack would highly surpass the benefits.
But I suspect some people would be valuable targets for this.
And given that is firmware, it's worse than that: the manufacturer can with a firmware update remove (that you can't downgrade thanks to all this security bullshit) the possibility to disable secure boot and revoke the keys used by Linux distributions. Reason why I tend to never update the firmware of computers (as to me the firmware is just a bootloader to GRUB that then boots the operating system).
The real thing is, we don't need this kind of security. We don't need ME, PSP, PSB, TPM, and all kind of bullshit. I've never herd of an attack in real life that exploits the boot process. When 99% of computers runs Windows that is full of security vulnerabilities, and nearly half of them even a no longer supported version of Windows, the other half a non updated version because updates are a waste of time.