Usually (when the primary potential enemy is an opposing superpower held in check via MAD), you either want exactly that (as a palpable thread signal to get the other side to back down in an escalating crisis, or as the palpable absence of such a signal when you are just doing routine exercises) or MAD has completely failed and we’re all going to die.
I seriously doubt that the people directly wielding these weapons actually want to use them. A small information leak indicating potential escalation like this, while still hiding exact deployment orders, may actually be desirable.
I agree, but I would argue you could decouple notifying the world and notifying your force, but perhaps that would remove the teeth behind the message. And further, it could be entirely possible they've already decoupled and Skyking is just theatrics
2. SKYKING is a group callsign for any aircraft operating under the SIOP (if you don't have the action word on your list, the message isn't for you). I saw a talk from a former U2 spy plane pilot that mentioned receiving a SKYKING message to alert them they had been detected by hostile forces.
If you make the communications mostly continuous, then real messages are lost in the noise.
I'm specifically talking about these unencrypted parts:
1. The number of "Skyking do not answer"s indicates the severity of the message.
2. The fact that it is known that messages to Skyking are for a nuclear force.
I wouldn't want an adversary to know when or with what severity I am commanding my nuclear force. It leaks significant information that an adversary can use, for instance, to judge your response to some action the adversary took.