I think this is a valid point today. Will it remain so in the future?
If say liabilities for bugs in critical software shift or if natsec regulations require software that touch infra like: water, power, telecom, and mass transit to be verified like avionics software is. IMO both are likely 2-3 decades out.
Either or both of these happening will expand demand for more hardened platform-level code.
Over time, perhaps the available monopolies will dry up, a few megafirms will buy up everything that can collect rents, and the only software left to write will be practical.
This can be mitigated by designing robust systems that are robust to flaws of its components. There is an understanding that bugs or corruption way happen and the system should able to tollerate it and fix itself or alert people that something is wrong or needs to be addressed.
The problem is that in practice when people reach for C, they reach for stb_image.h, not formal verification packages that are expensive and used for approximately no software in mainstream use outside of fields like avionics. The economics of formal verification just don't work for mainstream software. Organizations are simply not willing to multiply their development costs by 10x or 100x.