Re:CISA Director on Log4j Vulnerability
by simcop2387 on Sunday December 12, 2021 @02:51AM
(#29527879)
Thag would also mean blocking any apis that use json. This would not end well in the short term, or long term.
You could probably write a more advanced check than just "{" that would let most JSON through while still blocking the attack.
Re:CISA Director on Log4j Vulnerability
by PeterisP on Sunday December 12, 2021 @09:56AM
(#29530105)
The devil is in the details. As a random example, you might have a process where all the pre-WAF requests (or explicitly the requests blocked by WAF) get forwarded to a log analysis system that itself uses log4j and is vulnerable, allowing the attacker to gain RCE in your monitoring infrastructure.
Also, blocking any request containing "{" is tricky - like, that's so generic that it's time-consuming to verify that it won't break anything, and it's very likely that JSON is used somewhere in that application traffic, so you can't simply do that.
You could also have a log analysis system that displays logs in the browser and has an XSS vulnerability. So that bypass isn't unique to log4j.
> JSON
You could probably write a more advanced check than just "{" that would let most JSON through while still blocking the attack.
Re:CISA Director on Log4j Vulnerability
by miohtama on Sunday December 12, 2021 @05:24AM
(#29528455)
Cloudflare did something along these lines:
https://blog.cloudflare.com/how-cloudflare-security-responde...
Yes, some attacks could still get through (e.g. a backend that receives requests base64-encoded), but that's the case generally with WAFs I think.