These transactions made sense only in a world where the mortgage issuers knew they could turn around and resell them before the ink was even dry. The buyers of this paper, in turn, were only willing to pay when they knew they could bundle the obviously-sketchy loans into securities that allowed them to safely extract a 'clean' payment stream. And by 'safely' I mean they knew they could dump the toxic byproducts on buyers who could insure against (very likely) losses. This backstop position required the participation of an insurance firm (AIG) that was free from any legal requirement to hold collateral commensurate with their exposure to risk.
Everyone involved in this racket knew full well that the 'investment' operations they were running were fully enmeshed with the boring but vital infrastructure of everyday banking - paychecks, credit card processing, savings accounts, etc. In other words, they knew they had the country by the throat. So it's not that they were too big to fail - they were too important to fail. When the music inevitably stopped, there was never any doubt that taxpayers would get the shaft.
All this was possible because the firms involved have so much power in Washington that their lobbyists literally wrote the law, handing drafts to their former colleagues who working directly for the Senators and Congressmen in change of rubber-stamping these 'rules'.
Nothing in this - and I mean nothing - is even remotely consistent with victim-hood in any sense of the word. The fact that the banks are playing this card - which entails admitting that their lender verification and risk-management standards are utterly worthless - indicates that they feel perfectly safe in making what should be deeply incriminating remarks with absolutely no fear of sanction.
When the rating agencies modeled up new asset classes, they naturally gathered as much historical data as possible. For NINJA loans, the historical dataset was pretty small, since banks don't normally lend to such hopeless cases. However, when they did lend, the facts of the particular loan normally went something like : House buyer works for himself as a builder/developer, gets paid in cash, plays golf with the bank manager - and everyone knows that he's good for repayment (even if his tax returns don't show any income).
The major problem with this is that the statistical data did not contain these qualitative factors, and showed only that people with No (declared) Income, No (on-the-books) Job and No (visible) Assets paid back their loans consistently. That became codified into a simple fill-in-the-form application which missed the entire point... And loan brokers went to town, with the loans eventually packaged up and dumped into a pool.
At it's heart, the root cause of the problem is that rating agencies did a horrible job of understanding the risks that were embedded in the different types of loans. And no-one had an incentive to let them in on the 'trick' (and, perhaps, the rating agencies were willfully blind to what was going on). Since the middle-men were only short-term holders of each mortgage, the risk got transferred from modeling spreadsheet to investors in pools who trusted the ratings agencies within months or weeks.
Frankly, the politicians were completely outside the loop, and the regulators trusted that the Rating Agencies were doing a good job. Terrible assumptions.
In fact, banks typically sold off the AAA tranches and kept the toxic waste for themselves. If housing continued to go up this would not have caused any problems.
Regardless, even if banks and homeowners were conspirators, why should regulators punish one while rewarding the other? Shouldn't both parties be punished?
There was no "AAA" tranche, all the tranches were garbage. Magnetar Capital used the fallacy of the "A Tranche" to their advantage by selling off most of the CDO to suckers, then buying insurance against the whole thing.
Housing would have only continued to go up so long as people bought houses & people could only buy houses because they were being given loans they could not repay.
This is the first time I've heard that "foreclosure" is rewarding someone. I would agree that if the borrower knowingly falsified their income without influence or misguidance by the bank then they should be held responsible, but often that was not the case. The banks created a culture that lowered it's standards to the lowest levels, then either helped guide people into lying about their financial information, didn't ask about it or never verified it. They also helped promote things like ARMs which were big at the time because the low initial rate made it much easier to fit people into these loans. The banks didn't really check how feasible it would be for the person to pay back the loan once their rate adjusted though.
I suggest you go educate yourself. The banks constructed securities which were rated by various agencies as AAA.
Regardless of whether the AAA rating was deserved, the which the banks sold had a lower risk than the non-AAA rated tranches which the banks kept on their books. Why would they do this if they knew the securities were unlikely to pay off?
This is the first time I've heard that "foreclosure" is rewarding someone.
According to the article, regulators are pressing banks to pay $20B, "with much of the money earmarked to reduce mortgages of homeowners facing foreclosure." That's a reward for people unable to meet their obligations, many of whom are likely to have lied on their application.
...the bank falsified the application themselves.
[citation needed]
Tranches are parts of a CDO. The problem with subprime CDOs is that none of the tranches were of any quality. They all sucked. There was no "A tranche", it was all a bunch of garbage tranches. As for the "AAA" rating, that's a rating assigned to the whole CDO by a rating agency such as Moody's or Standard & Poor's.
Toxic assets weren't always considered toxic. Some thought the bubble would last forever, some knew it would end but didn't know when & didn't want to miss out. Firms would get commissions for making or selling securities. Buyers of these securities made calculations that woefully underestimated mortage default rates & to make matters worse, borrowed money to buy these crap investments. Firms weren't required to keep the bad tranche of the CDOs either, they could rebundle all portions of CDOs into other CDOs(http://www.propublica.org/article/banks-self-dealing-super-c...). It's kind of like a factory where you're producing a large volume of inventory which you think is good(or know is crap but hope no one finds out), until word finally comes out that all your merchandise has a fatal defect. You're still stuck with your crappy merchandise & have to payback your debts. It's more complicated than that though when you get down to leveraging & the default swap daisy chains, essentially they all built a house of cards. You really have to wonder how they thought it would all pan out in the end.
As for who is to blame, the banks & Wall Street hold the vast majority of the blame. These are the people paid millions to do their job & they failed miserably. There are many reasons home owners can't pay. I am sure there are some who gave fraudulent information, but I am also sure you'll find many who weren't over their heads when they got into the loan but have been affected by the downturn in the economy. Additionally you will find stories of people who know they can no longer pay & are trying to do the right thing by working with the bank to adjust their payment plan or arrange a short sale, but often banks have been very hard to work with or it's even difficult to find out who owns your mortgage due to the mess (mortgage inside an MBS inside of a CDO is parts of which are inside another CDO, that is owned by a firm that was bought out by a firm within another firm).
As for banks falsifying documents, here you go:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/20/wells-fargo-subprim...
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/10/02/robo-signing-scandal-...
This is simply incorrect. Each tranch gets a separate rating since senior tranches have a different risk profile than junior or equity tranches.
Please go learn the mechanics of CDO's, it's far more useful than just discussing them with vague metaphors ("it's like a sausage factory, full of stinky socks, run by villains...").
As for banks falsifying documents...
I didn't ask about any instance of banks falsifying documents, I asked about banks falsifying loan applications. This has nothing whatsoever to do with robo signing.
Incidentally, you did a nice job editing the text I quoted out of your original post.
But wasn't that based on the assumption that there was a low correlation between the mortgages that made up CDOs - which turned out to be completely wrong (and for fairly straightforward reasons)?
Please spend some time learning what a CDO is, and the reason why will be fairly clear.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collateralized_debt_obligation#...
The junior and senior tranches can only be equally risky if the probability distribution is perfectly binary (i.e., the only possibilities are either all borrowers pay 100% back, or all borrowers pay 0% back). This is simply a mathematical identity.
So what did go wrong with the way CDOs were supposed to work and they did work in reality?
Edit:
Actually - genuine question here. When someone says "This is simply a mathematical identity." - how is all of this stuff grounded in reality - do people actually do controlled experiments to work out if any of this stuff is scientific?
Are any of these theories falsifiable?
Counterparty risk.
Home loan CDO's were supposed to allow people to take a long position on housing. Assuming counterparties didn't go belly up, they would have done exactly that - the owners of various securities would have made money when housing went up and lost when housing went down.
When someone says "This is simply a mathematical identity." - how is all of this stuff grounded in reality - do people actually do controlled experiments to work out if any of this stuff is scientific?
It's just basic arithmetic. The borrowers are going to pay out a certain amount of money. The senior tranch gets paid first. If any money is left, the junior tranch gets paid. Short of politicians overriding the rule of law (e.g. the GM bankruptcy), there is no scenario where the junior tranch gets a payout and the senior tranch does not.
Presumably you mean the people taking out the mortgages?
The possibility of borrowers defaulting is already incorporated into the CDO.
Or if you're in bed with ratings agencies who will rate whatever, however you want & you have an entire industry that will take their word for it.
You should take some of your own medicine & read my first link to Huffington Post:
"Perhaps more than 10,000 Wells Fargo borrowers were inappropriately steered into more expensive subprime mortgages or had their loan documents falsified by bank personnel, the Federal Reserve said Wednesday."
I added the robo-signing scandal as more evidence that they are willing to play underhanded. Additionally the reason for robo-signing & rushing through the foreclosures may have been a tactic to hide deals that had less than valid documentation & sweep them under the carpet.
As for editing, I did rearrange or restate some things differently, but I didn't remove the two lines you quoted.
The story of my mortgage is a good illustration of how ridiculous the banks were in approving mortgages:
I bought my first house in 2007, after almost 30 years of apartment living. I analyzed the crap out of my budget, and concluded that I could take up to a $300k loan tops. Any more would put in territory where my mortgage payments would be at a very risky level, and I'd have to be careful on spending to keep from falling behind.
I went to Countrywide to get pre-approved so I could go house hunting. My credit rating had normally hovered around 790 at the big three, but when they pulled my credit report it happened to have zoomed up to around 830 (I do not know why). They asked for two months worth of bank statements covering my regular bank account and my investments, and pay stubs for the last month.
Result? They would pre-approve up to $750k, and instead of an appraisal on any house I decided to buy they would just do some kind of online check of tax or insurance records.
WTF?
They are supposed to be professionals in this area. Yet they were willing to let me have a loan WAY beyond my means, and to trust my judgement as to the value of a house--based on the fact I've got a job, have managed to save a decent down payment, and my credit score is high (which doesn't show any financial sophistication--it just shows I have been able to pay my bill on time).
I laughed at the ridiculous amount they were willing to pre-approve, and told them $300k was a big enough pre-approval for me, and continued looking for houses in the range I determined I could afford. (I ended up borrowing $224k).
They are professionals; they know how to shape the system to work in their favour, not in your favour.
What about the bank that encouraged the home buyer to inflate or falsify their incomes? So far at least, they've largely escaped consequences for their pattern of encouraging fraud and shirking on their due diligence.
JP Morgan picked up Bear in a fire sale, for a billion. Bear's Office building in NYC was worth more.
Lehman went bankrupt.. but our government (us taxpayers) had to eat the mortgages in order for other banks to buy Lehman's assets. The banks just moved the money from A to B.
BofA picked up Merrill for peanuts.
Wachovia was picked up by Well Fargo. Another fire sale.
And who lost out? Us taxpayers, and the employees. Mostly the back office staff. Most of the traders kept their jobs (and bonuses). And the executies made billions in buyouts, parachutes and stock transactions.
he was fined by the SEC for $65 million and barred from ever being a CEO of a public company.
He is not in jail. Also Countrywide is on the hook for 15 of that 65 million fine. That was part of his agreement with the company. And he didn't have to admit "wrong doing".
The criminal case against him has been dropped. Again, he's not in jail.
And no, no one is in jail AFAIK.
"Everything's fucked up, and nobody goes to jail," he said. "That's your whole story right there. Hell, you don't even have to write the rest of it. Just write that."
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-isnt-wall-stre...
I never understand this reflexive need of some people like yourself to defend the big powerful institutions in this type of discussion.
Did you read the article? The article claims this is exactly what happened.
Not anything outright fraudulent, but I suspect there was a lot of intentional looking the other way and "spinning" going on by the banks, while at the same time telling the loan-seekers that it was "just how it works".
Back in the "good old days", a banker wouldn't want to inflate your credit-worthiness on a mortgage loan application because his or her bank would be relying on you to repay the loan. But once a bank could securitize your loan and there were limited to no consequences to their funding liar loans, you started to see more and more of them flooding the market.
"...failed to perform the due diligence required under securities law and missed evidence that borrowers’ incomes were inflated or falsified."
The contention is that the banks did not due their due diligence in rooting out this fraud. So why are the regulators "[p]ressing the banks to pay at least $20 billion in that case, with much of the money earmarked to reduce mortgages of homeowners facing foreclosure?"
Shouldn't the regulators be prosecuting the people who took out fraudulent mortgages, rather than pressuring banks to reward them?