I wonder if this wasn’t intended for something bigger and they just got caught when testing this out in the field.
If you sent a message to everyone with a client (that logged that message), everyone with a client would at least ping back to the ldap server.
The issue where this was introduced was: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/LOG4J2-313
That's from 2013 (Minecraft was 2 years old then) On the other hand, nothing with it really happened until someone asked if it was a security vulnerability - https://github.com/apache/logging-log4j2/pull/608#issuecomme...
And then all hell broke loose.
Simply said, this was a feature that was intended to make it easier for one company to use their structure with ldap lookups for where/how to log. The author of the change did what many people encourage others to do when working with open source "here's some code that I wrote, I'm contributing it back upstream."
If this was part of something "bigger", it sat quiet for the better part of a decade.
No consideration, no discussion, no security analysis, just “JDNI is cool, can I hav plz? Ofc!”
Did none of these people consider what JDNI is designed to do?
Did none of these people consider what side-effects are appropriate within a logging library?
As an open source developer working on a project that hadn't even been formally released, I'd be quite pleased to have someone else contributing the features that they found useful back upstream in an effort to make it a better project.
Yes, this is what jndi is supposed to do. Was it done as best as it could be? Probably not. But it isn't something that's only in log4j2
http://logback.qos.ch/manual/loggingSeparation.html#ContextJ...
https://dennis-xlc.gitbooks.io/the-logback-manual/content/en...
But I'm not going to fault a solo developer of some beta software in the world of 2013 for not rejecting a patch because every angle wasn't thought out.
Then three days ago someone asked "Is it a security vulnerability" and then everything happened.
This wasn't any great "there's a security bug that needs to be patched yesterday" and then a fix and release but rather an after the fact, when looking at it, was it realized the scope of the issue.
If the RCE had been responsibly disclosed instead of via tweets and PR comments, maybe there wouldn't have had to be so much scrambling. And indeed maybe ASF could have found corporate OSPOs to help with remediation.
There are lots pixels being spilled on how the users of open source software should be paying for it (?), but I haven't seen much criticism of the vulnerability not being responsibly disclosed.