Not everything has to be TLS or even HTTP. Look at messaging apps. Signal is encrypted, but the end-to-end encryption it uses isn't TLS and doesn't use certificate authorities.
> If Lets Encrypt ever goes corrupt like dot Org did it would cause an incredible amount of trouble and that entity would have power over a large portion of the web, if not the entire internet.
Not really. Let's Encrypt doesn't have a monopoly over anything. They use an open protocol (ACME) that any other CA could implement. If they went evil, someone else would implement the same protocol and everybody would switch to them. Which also implies that they won't, because why bother if that's what will happen?
This is kind of a problem with the CA system the other way -- if you have one bad CA they can sign any domain even if they shouldn't -- but in this case it prevents what you're worried about.
This is why certificate transparency is a thing and most browsers require it for public internet domains[0,1].
0: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/refs/heads/...
For reference, many CAs (even paid ones) have implemented it:
Digicert https://docs.digicert.com/certificate-tools/Certificate-life...
Sectigo (formerly Comodo) https://sectigo.com/resource-library/sectigo-adds-acme-proto...
Not that it's much better. IPs are still granted to you by someone in a centralized hierarchy.
If you allow self signed certificates, anyone who can MITM traffic can masquerade your site just like with http
Self signed does however stop passive fibre taps - to intercept you need to MITM.
There then the “remember this cert” option. If I visit www.selfsigned.com on a secure network, my browser remembers the certificate. If I then travel to another network with a MITM, my browser can flag up a warning. This is how SSH works.
However I’m not too concerned by SSL certificates as a centralised point - my browser trusts dozens, probably more than 100, root certificates. That’s not centralisation.
If we're not going to show interstitial warning pages for HTTP-not-S sites, so you can't see if it's HTTPS without checking the address bar, then a red open padlock and a red strike through the "https" seems sufficient for self-signed HTTPS sites. Some indication is needed, otherwise you'd see the "https" and think it was secure, but the indication shouldn't be scarier than HTTP-not-S!
https://ccadb-public.secure.force.com/mozilla/CAInformationR...
The problem here is the word "Always". Encryption is good for just the reasons they say. But only encryption, always encryption, not having an option for plain text is highly centralizing in itself. This is because the current status quo for encryption is to use TLS based on certificate authorities. And CAs are always highly centralized and highly centralizing.
If Lets Encrypt ever goes corrupt like dot Org did it would cause an incredible amount of trouble and that entity would have power over a large portion of the web, if not the entire internet. There's an easy solution to this though. Don't throw alway plain protocls. Plain and TLS wrapped are synergistic. Use both. There's no need for, and it is damaging, to always encrypt without an option for plain text.
A hypothetical downgrade attack is not an excuse for using only highly centralized TLS CA based protocols in this context.