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Re:Avoiding Internet Centralization by superkuh on Thursday December 09, 2021 @05:54PM (#29504198)
> 5.2. Encrypt, Always: When deployed at scale, encryption can be an effective technique to reduce many inherited centralization risks. ...

The problem here is the word "Always". Encryption is good for just the reasons they say. But only encryption, always encryption, not having an option for plain text is highly centralizing in itself. This is because the current status quo for encryption is to use TLS based on certificate authorities. And CAs are always highly centralized and highly centralizing.

If Lets Encrypt ever goes corrupt like dot Org did it would cause an incredible amount of trouble and that entity would have power over a large portion of the web, if not the entire internet. There's an easy solution to this though. Don't throw alway plain protocls. Plain and TLS wrapped are synergistic. Use both. There's no need for, and it is damaging, to always encrypt without an option for plain text.

A hypothetical downgrade attack is not an excuse for using only highly centralized TLS CA based protocols in this context.

Re:Avoiding Internet Centralization by AnthonyMouse on Thursday December 09, 2021 @06:27PM (#29504542)
> This is because the current status quo for encryption is to use TLS based on certificate authorities.

Not everything has to be TLS or even HTTP. Look at messaging apps. Signal is encrypted, but the end-to-end encryption it uses isn't TLS and doesn't use certificate authorities.

> If Lets Encrypt ever goes corrupt like dot Org did it would cause an incredible amount of trouble and that entity would have power over a large portion of the web, if not the entire internet.

Not really. Let's Encrypt doesn't have a monopoly over anything. They use an open protocol (ACME) that any other CA could implement. If they went evil, someone else would implement the same protocol and everybody would switch to them. Which also implies that they won't, because why bother if that's what will happen?

This is kind of a problem with the CA system the other way -- if you have one bad CA they can sign any domain even if they shouldn't -- but in this case it prevents what you're worried about.

Re:Avoiding Internet Centralization by judge2020 on Thursday December 09, 2021 @11:03PM (#29506264)
> if you have one bad CA they can sign any domain even if they shouldn't -- but in this case it prevents what you're worried about.

This is why certificate transparency is a thing and most browsers require it for public internet domains[0,1].

0: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/refs/heads/...

1: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT205280

Re:Avoiding Internet Centralization by judge2020 on Thursday December 09, 2021 @10:57PM (#29506230)
> that any other CA could implement.

For reference, many CAs (even paid ones) have implemented it:

Digicert https://docs.digicert.com/certificate-tools/Certificate-life...

Sectigo (formerly Comodo) https://sectigo.com/resource-library/sectigo-adds-acme-proto...

Re:Avoiding Internet Centralization by immibis on Friday December 10, 2021 @06:28AM (#29508670)
I'm surprised if Signal doesn't use TLS, considering that Android tries to force apps to always use TLS, which is because of the point the parent comment is making.
Re:Avoiding Internet Centralization by foxfluff on Thursday December 09, 2021 @06:52PM (#29504787)
LE also forces you to rely on DNS, which is highly centralized..
Re:Avoiding Internet Centralization by midasuni on Thursday December 09, 2021 @08:11PM (#29505301)
How is DNS centralised?
Re:Avoiding Internet Centralization by judge2020 on Thursday December 09, 2021 @10:34PM (#29506115)
All roads lead to . [0], ie. IANA. Many IANA-approved entities run them[1], but they all only resolve TLDs ICANN authorizes (and those TLD operators control what domains are registered under their TLD, of course).

0: https://dns.google/query?name=.&rr_type=NS&ecs=

1: https://www.iana.org/domains/root/servers

Re:Avoiding Internet Centralization by im3w1l on Thursday December 09, 2021 @10:43PM (#29506155)
Well on a technical level there are root servers. But DNS is a hierarchy and so if the root servers ever tried to pull a fast one there are second-in-command authorities that could take over: the cctld orgs. People would rather follow their lead than ICANN, so they have the real power. I'm pretty sure this is by design.
Re:Avoiding Internet Centralization by xxpor on Thursday December 09, 2021 @07:06PM (#29504875)
What CA doesn't?
Re:Avoiding Internet Centralization by hackmiester on Thursday December 09, 2021 @07:22PM (#29504978)
I don't think it was meant as a criticism, just a statement of the current status quo, which is inherently rooted in the centralized DNS.
Re:Avoiding Internet Centralization by foxfluff on Friday December 10, 2021 @06:02AM (#29508548)
There are many CAs that give certs for IPs. LE won't.

Not that it's much better. IPs are still granted to you by someone in a centralized hierarchy.

Re:Avoiding Internet Centralization by gefhfff on Thursday December 09, 2021 @06:12PM (#29504392)
Encryption does not imply authentication, does it?
Re:Avoiding Internet Centralization by superkuh on Thursday December 09, 2021 @06:19PM (#29504463)
Browsers scaremonger really hard about self-signed SSL certs. And browsers are starting to implement HTTPS only as a default. It won't be too long before HTTP is blocked by mega-corp browsers and not having a CA TLS cert means your website is now un-visitable by non-technical people (and not indexed by search engines).
Re:Avoiding Internet Centralization by midasuni on Thursday December 09, 2021 @07:16PM (#29504943)
The concern about http over https is that a bad actor can intercept and change traffic.

If you allow self signed certificates, anyone who can MITM traffic can masquerade your site just like with http

Self signed does however stop passive fibre taps - to intercept you need to MITM.

There then the “remember this cert” option. If I visit www.selfsigned.com on a secure network, my browser remembers the certificate. If I then travel to another network with a MITM, my browser can flag up a warning. This is how SSH works.

However I’m not too concerned by SSL certificates as a centralised point - my browser trusts dozens, probably more than 100, root certificates. That’s not centralisation.

Re:Avoiding Internet Centralization by immibis on Friday December 10, 2021 @06:30AM (#29508678)
Self-signed certs should be no scarier than unencrypted connections. If self-signed certs are allowed then you can have a case for banning unencrypted connections - the way Mozilla tried to do in the past, but they didn't allow self-signed certs.

If we're not going to show interstitial warning pages for HTTP-not-S sites, so you can't see if it's HTTPS without checking the address bar, then a red open padlock and a red strike through the "https" seems sufficient for self-signed HTTPS sites. Some indication is needed, otherwise you'd see the "https" and think it was secure, but the indication shouldn't be scarier than HTTP-not-S!

Re:Avoiding Internet Centralization by mistrial9 on Thursday December 09, 2021 @10:17PM (#29506039)
this seems to be a well-known list of trusted Certificate Authorities

https://ccadb-public.secure.force.com/mozilla/CAInformationR...