> all seem to be presented in a way that deliberately ignores any downsides

If I understand correctly, the point of this article (one of several) is just to establish that a land tax would constitute a large amount of money. I get the impression the article was supposed to merely establish whether a land tax would generate a substantial amount of money whether good or bad, though admittedly the author tips his hand as to what his conclusion is. I'm also hopeful for the next article, I've been wanting a good reference on Georgism that wasn't book length to point people at for years.

> If I understand correctly, the point of this article (one of several) is just to establish that a land tax would constitute a large amount of money.

We could make a land value tax constitute any amount we’d like.

Just take the value you want it to produce, divide by the assessed value of all of the land, and you have your tax rate.

That’s not an interesting question, though. The interesting part is whether or not that’s reasonable or fair, and to explore who wins and loses.

> Just take the value you want it to produce, divide by the assessed value of all of the land, and you have your tax rate.

That's how my city determines property tax rates! Cities in my province are not allowed to run a deficit. So every year, the city look as assessed value of all properties, how much budget it needs for the year, divides the two, and voila! Tax rate!

It's actually a bit more complicated because the residential and commercial tax rates are different and the city has revenue sources other than property taxes, but it is largely like that.

The Georgist answer is that the government wouldn't decide the value of the land, the market would. If the government is setting it, it's almost certainly not pricing it optimally.

If you tax the land at a rate greater than a 100% LVT, the market price of the building will be less than the improvement value, and therefore there will not be a good reason for builders to build. This will create distortions that are harmful and you will ultimately see less tax money.

More than 100% over how long?

You calculate the rent at day $500 per month and tax at 550 per month.

Remember the valuation is based on the rental value of the land, not the capital purchase of the land.

Its basically rent so it doesnt matter if you calculate it by day or by year.

This book review on the same site does a pretty good job in my opinion: https://astralcodexten.substack.com/p/your-book-review-progr...

> The second part looks to be more interesting: I’d like to see some arguments for why a LVT wouldn’t just be passed along to the renters like every other expense is currently.

I think the general idea goes something like: a new apartment can collect $10k/mo rent, and so after construction expenses a developer can pay say $5k/mo for the land. These numbers don't change with a LVT or not.

Without the LVT, the $5k/mo that they can afford translates to say a $500k mortgage, which roughly determines the land price (as multiple developers bid for the same land).

With a LVT, there's say a $2k/mo tax, so they only have $3k/mo to pay the mortgage, which translates to a $300k land price using the same logic.

So by working backwards in this simple thought experiment the LVT is just reducing the value of the land without changing much else about the housing market. Intuitively it also sounds reasonable that taxing land values might reduce land values as a result.

I'd be interested to see the upcoming detailed analysis though.

For the winners / losers computation, one thing that's clear is that land value taxes are highly progressive.

Rich people own most of the land. There are no tax loopholes to evade land taxes.

> There are no tax loopholes to evade land taxes.

Of course there is! You just lobby or bribe your politicians to value your land at a lower amount. They make up for it by valuing someone else’s land at a higher amount.

So much of the LVT discourse assumes perfect valuations, but if you reduce everything to these variable valuations then the politics will just start modifying the valuations. We’d have an entire book full of LVT modifiers, exceptions, and tax breaks in no time.

> We’d have an entire book full of LVT modifiers, exceptions, and tax breaks in no time.

Indeed, and even without these, we'd have the "LVT assessors" getting bribed or being buddy-buddy with rich landowning families. Obviously we already have that today with property taxes (not to mention permit approvals).

Paraphrasing what you said elsewhere, "The interesting part is to explore the net effects."

I suspect LVT would end up, overall, encouraging building more housing. It could even be sold as "lowering or eliminating taxes (on improvements to the land)". I also suspect there would be no end to the shenanigans played to manipulate LVT's. I doubt it would be much worse than today's situation, but I might be very surprised!

All the land value taxes would be public record. Think it'd be hard to have your land valued differently than your neighbor.

This LVT is lower because the land is closer to a highway, therefore less desirable due to pollution.

This LVT is higher because the land is closer to a highway, therefore more desirable due to ease of commute.

This LVT is lower because the land is closer to heavy industry, therefore less desirable due to pollution.

This LVT is higher because the land is closer to heavy industry, therefore more desirable due to being closer to the largest employer.

This LVT is lower because the land is more likely to flood.

This LVT is higher because the land is closer to the beach.

I agree these superficial "examples" would appear absurd to the people who own the land, but so much of property taxes are already shenanigans. I'm not convinced that Georgist LVT will make this any worse than it already is, but things are currently terrible in this regard and I expect they'll continue to be terrible with a Georgist LVT.

Maybe a little better because at least with LVT there would be fewer variables to hide the nepotism behind.

Yes, definitely agree that California's random property tax laws (like Prop 13) are the opposite of free market, libertarian tax policies like a land tax

That's the real reason it "won't work." Enormous vested interests oppose it.

Of course, an engaged and educated populace could overcome that.

Or an enlightened elite class who realized they could boost overall wealth and technological advancement with efficient fiscal policy... short run pain for elites in exchange for long run benefits (for them and everyone else).

> Enormous vested interests oppose it.

> Of course, an engaged and educated populace could overcome that.

The "populace" is the "vested interest" that opposes it! The majority of voters are homeowners, and thus their material interests lie in land values rising. As a concrete example of this, Prop 13 was passed by a referendum, not politicians.

As a general point, I think housing is the major weak policy point for the left. The overarching theory that drives their politics is that the wealthy and powerful are the major barriers to positive change. Housing is the one area where that isn't true; the barrier to improvement is the "average" person.

>The article also had an unsettlingly high number of “If we assume that X is true, then Y is a reasonable conclusion” while completely sidestepping an examination of whether or not “X” was true or even reasonable

Those are generally after listing a range of different projections, and are something like "if we assume the lowest projection is true, we see x, with the highest we see y. Both are significant amounts."