In order to do that, you need to somehow get Linus to merge it successfully. And that doesn't work per git's design.
If all you want is to have "exploitable" commit IDs in the kernel git, you don't need to do anything sneaky at all! They're already there, being historical bugs that have since been fixed.
sudo su - linus
cd /path/to/linux-2.6.git
modify/exploit code and git commit
I for example do a daily git pull - I will get the the tainted code and not notice it at all.
NO?
What you can't do is inject code that ends up in 3.1-rc5, because before that gets tagged Linus (and a lot of other people) would have to do a merge that would fail inexplicably.
But to be clear: yes, with access to the repository you can (for a brief moment until it's noticed) inject exploit code that will be picked up by anyone building and running an untagged branch HEAD.
If I as a developer then pull and verify signatures, I would note that commit was unsigned and expect the commit to be compromised.
and that's not just linux.git, but also the ton of other .git's in there, which linus will pull from and will not read every line of.
The caveat here is as real as it can get. usually when it looks "slightly complex" people overlook the security aspect "no one is going to do such an attack"
then the attack happens, often unnoticed, because the attackers aren't lazy if there's a hole they use it.