How fast could we develop? In addition to the requirements, we were also handed a schedule (a PERT chart, if anyone still knows what that is). It was laughably padded. Padded so much that it would have been impossible to fall behind schedule. I almost always finished my work for the day before lunch. Sometimes I would then go for a three martini lunch with the sales guys, or spend the afternoon in the library or flying the F-14 simulator. Sometimes I would spend the afternoon working on tools to make debugging easier. It was a fun job, but ultimately unsatisfying and I left after two years.
Fucking bad from what I've read. It's a really bad problem still and the USN needs to correct it by having a tighter integration with the HW/SW people and the actual soldiers/sailors.
I can't believe that after all this time, it's still completely borked, in all the same ways.
Somebody at NAVSEA needs to be dragged by their nostrils out on a deployment, take notes, and go back to their office with their pride in a garbage bag.
Proud as hell to have served, and angry as hell that our current crews are still dealing with the same ---procurement--- failures.
Work with the actual user/operators (this I did see a lot of, but not on new systems, only on systems in "maintenance") to get regular feedback. One of the best jobs of this I saw brought in both current and retired operators. Current ones rotated through helping evaluate the system and the requirements, retired ones were hired on to be part of test/QA.
Switch from fixed contracts to more level of effort contracts.
Generally shift towards continuous delivery where possible (with information systems much easier than with embedded systems, but doable to an extent with embedded systems).
Fix the official release test phase which is often 6-24 months at the end, most of it waiting. This is part of the program's overall process which is very Waterfall in structure for most systems. I've seen work that was completed and put on a shelf for over a year before being evaluated for flight readiness. Well, it was useless to operators by that point [0] and delayed vital feedback for the next iteration. That's partly a logistics problem, but addressable.
Fix the lack of trust the operational test teams have for development teams. There was a complete lack of trust for the teams delivering the product to be tested, but the test plans for flight testing were often so bad that they were a joke (for the particular delivered systems, not flight test plans in general). If you don't have the trust, gain the trust. Take the existing operational test plans and back port them to your own test infrastructure and test efforts. Deliver that report along with the product, eventually they may trust your test reports and can start speeding things along.
As with all software, get as much testing done as early as you can. The longer you wait, the more costly it is to address discovered issues, particularly validation issues.
Finally, get experienced software engineers into program offices. Most of the time their "software engineers" are a recent college graduate, or someone from a totally unrelated field that wrote some Matlab code once. They lack sufficient experience to properly manage or guide the management of the software portion of a project. The worst I saw with this was that system I mentioned in my previous comment, the program office lead for the software portion was a newly pinned on 1st LT history major. Zero technical experience (had been in some finance role before), they trusted the contractors too much and made decisions more on their input than anyone actually using the system.
[0] For context, this is software that spent 2-4 years being developed and then would be shelved for 1-2 years before being tested. Which meant it still had 1-2 years for fielding. So from conception to release you're talking 4-8 years. That is an awful pace.
But it's flabbergasting just how bad VMS is considering it's the navigation system for these national assets. It's not like an HR system with poor UX--navigation is essential to the safety and effectiveness of the whole platform!
It's because the people making decisions care about putting money where it earns the most return and have more on their plate than they can address. Making software more pleasant for internal users rarely makes it to the top of the list.
> navigation is essential to the safety and effectiveness of the whole platform!
Subs crash very rarely, so the software seems to be sufficient.
Subs also operated for many decades without any kind of computer-assisted navigation, and training to handle the loss of such systems is routine, so your statement is pretty vacuous. The software at a minimum should allow sailors to operate as safely as they did without it, but one would assume that the entire point of software assistance is to improve safety and/or operational effectiveness.
Fortunately all the projects I have worked on aren't related to combat or anything where actual people could be hurt.
As they moved away from embedded to more networked and newer tech stacks things got terrible. The software world of today is not compatible with the needs of the defense industry.
Plus all the red tape and misdirection. The software need comes from an organizational budget that has to use money to justify receiving money. Then it funnels down into political buckets, who use the dollar amount given to determine needs/wants. Then it goes back up the chain to the government. Then to a contractor, then a flurry of subcontractors. Then finally a developer. Rarely is the warfighter who will actually use the system consulted. Even then, rarely will the programmer meet that person using the software.
Yet they all call themselves "agile" now.