A small publisher who is making say $300,000 from their work after 40 years can't afford to register it, but Disney can easily afford the 50 year fee.
Also, the reason for registration right away is because otherwise you can't be sure a work is in the public domain or who to license it from for at least however long the no registration period is. If it's 10 years, then you have to wait at least 10 years to find out if someone has a claim on it.
Registration is a heavy burden that has caused all sorts of pain in the past, and although terms are unreasonable these days I do think that automatic copyright is reasonable. You’re not unsure for ten years, you know for ten years from publication that it’s copyrighted—so you contact whoever wrote it, if you can find them, or you wait and see if not (which would be the case if it was registered anyway, since you can’t predict whether they’re going to renew the thing).
Actually, another argument against requiring registration: it strongly favours big publishers, who know the rules and are used to filling in the paperwork, and makes life harder for individuals, especially in the case of unexpected success (“I didn’t bother registering it because it’s been a waste of time every other time and I didn’t expect it to get popular”). After ten years, you’ll have a fairer idea whether your work is of meaningful commercial value, for which the answer is normally “no”.
So Disney, who effectively has a monopoly on certain popular content can copyright it for a long time because they're making so much money off of it, while a small time copyright owner who is making $10k a year will not be able to make money for very long.
It makes sense that in some cases large players will be capable of realizing benefits from things at scales that small ones simply can't match. A small player could still presumably sell their copyright to a large one if it appeared lucrative to continue extending it.
It's a matter of balancing freedoms against monopolies in order to maximize innovation. Large players often enjoy intrinsic economic advantages and I don't think that's necessarily a bad thing as long as it doesn't hurt consumers.
I wonder what other n-order consequences of this might be. The suggested approach will encourage small players to either focus on original content or compete with each other using public domain items. The big companies will buy or even rent out rights when original holders can't support the fee. This will happen around copyright fee increase breakpoints, the change of ownership will become more predictable, more pump and dump situations like with Star Wars happen to popular franchises. Predictable change of ownership will affect share prices, this will be in news all the time. If breakpoints will coincide with calendar years, the companies will try to maximize profits before the fee grows too much, resulting in super-competitive, choke full release schedules like what happens now around Christmas. We'll see weird variations of public domain content, like fan fiction, but on larger scale and more money for creators. Older, public domain content might see more demand thanks to derivative works it enables, and more demand means healthier content preservation efforts (more customers, more money to support the projects) and file sharing scene.
It's an interesting point. Yearly is terrible for individuals but if you think about it for a tax such as this large blocks are just paying for the smaller pieces all at once. It probably doesn't make sense to offer discounts since the express purpose is to discourage holding the copyright in the first place.
Not if you treat it as a Harberger* tax. If you do that, the small-time writer gets to keep his characters for a pittance, but Disney pays royally for all their princesses.
In this example of Disney's IP - it takes a lot of time and money to make a movie. A competitor to Disney could wait until they announce a new movie and then forcibly buy up enough rights to make the movie illegal to release. It encourages and creates a framework for sabotage among competitors.
The steady state is that one mega corp emerges victorious. Disney sets up a script that forcibly purchases any "super hero" adjacent IP. No small time creators would ever be allowed to exist, when large corporations are allowed to smother them so easily.
I also strongly disagree that this is the simpler option. Figuring out how to price your property and how often to re-asses would definitely bring about OP's concern of "gets messy, encourages dishonesty, and pretty much forces a new subindustry to spring up."
> A competitor to Disney could wait until they announce a new movie and then forcibly buy up enough rights to make the movie illegal to release.
In a de novo work like Toy Story, or a fully licensed work like Wreck-It Ralph, Disney owns the rights and knows their value when they announce the upcoming film. The problem only occurs in cases like Lion King, where an existing folk story gets Disneyfied, with no compensation, and often no credit, to the cultural originator of the story.
I'm ok with Disney needing to pay extra money while their competitors pay extra taxes, in cases like this.
* https://ristret.com/s/ftmbkg/harberger_taxation_has_elegant
The comparison was with OP's suggestion of replacing copyright with a simple tax, not with current copyright law. I agree Harberger taxes would be simpler than the existing system, though still not preferable.
> In a de novo work like Toy Story, or a fully licensed work like Wreck-It Ralph, Disney owns the rights and knows their value when they announce the upcoming film.
Sure, but a competitor could steal the rights out from under them in the time between announcing the film and the film hitting theaters.
There's another issue with not-yet-profitable IP. With Harberger taxes you wouldn't be able to protect IP while you're still working to build products around it. This is another way that smaller / new players get screwed with this type of system.
As I said, the forced buying / selling creates way more problems than it solves. All we are trying to do here is determine how high a tax should be. Inventing a scheme where people and companies can steal from each other (for a fee) is always going to have worse second order effects and be more complicated than just coming up with a price formula for the tax.
I think you’re undercounting the benefits and overcounting the side effects of incentive compatible mechanisms!
I guess that depends on how you define it. All the marvel characters and stories have existed for decades. The only thing new about the movies are the movies themselves
> a small creator could get immediate cash infusions simply by pricing his newly created characters at a large multiple of what he thinks he could make off them—that way, Disney’s buyout is a providential windfall instead of legal thievery.
Yeah, and run the risk of bankrupting themselves from the tax bill in the process.
I’m not convinced this would be a good fit for copyright in general, but it sounds very problematic for application to private persons in any field; in this case, your small-time writer would surely either overpay, or undervalue and have their work legally stolen from them by a Disney. Sounds like it’d favour the big entities that can play to the laws of averages.
But more generally, Harberger taxation seems a pretty cool concept, a genuine alternative to the current model of capitalism. I’m glad you mentioned it!
Just what we need, a Disney incentivized to cause rampant inflation...
I originally thought of that in jest, but honestly putting money is more stable assets or other currencies and supporting and lobbying for inflationist policies would probably be in their best interest, and they're powerful enough that it probably wouldn't be a good thing.
Ten years of free protection, then costing $10 × 1.5 ⁿ ⁻ ¹ for each subsequent year. Year 10 costs $0, year 20 about $380, year 30 about $22,000, year 40 about $1,300,000, year 50 almost $75,000,000—and few fifty-year-old things will be worth $75,000,000 per year and growing to retain copyright to. And I doubt any individual work would be worth the $4.25 billion of year 60 (10 × 1.5⁴⁹, incidentally just 1% short of 2³²), so that’s a rough absolute cap of 60 years.
You could scale the $10 base figure to inflation, or you could just schedule a review every decade or so, or you could even ignore inflation altogether, which would slowly extend average copyright terms (e.g. year N today would cost similar, indexed, to year N+1 20 years ago).
Concerning your registry, I don’t think you want to require a registry for the first ten years, but only for any extensions—and make it that if anyone can prove beyond reasonable doubt that you actually published the thing earlier than the date you claim when you register it, then your work is thrown into the public domain as punishment.