An update on attempted man-in-the-middle attacks

Re:An update on attempted man-in-the-middle attacks by willvarfar on Tuesday August 30, 2011 @01:29AM (#2940241)

The amazing thing is that:

1) it doesn't happen more often

2) that anyone noticed

Its clearly early days. If they had impersonated a download server, they could have got users to download a spiked copy of the browser itself

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Re:An update on attempted man-in-the-middle attacks by tlrobinson on Tuesday August 30, 2011 @02:41AM (#2940398)

There's also the possibility that it does happen often and no one notices, of course.

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Re:An update on attempted man-in-the-middle attacks by dredmorbius on Tuesday August 30, 2011 @10:51AM (#2941679)

Makes me wonder how you'd approach the "how do I find bad certs" problem.

You'd think that an entity which, say, scrapes a large portion of the Web on a regular basis ... might be able to detect such things.

Meanwhile, there's CertWatch http://certwatch.simos.info/ and The Convergence Project http://convergence.io/

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Re:An update on attempted man-in-the-middle attacks by jonknee on Tuesday August 30, 2011 @02:57AM (#2940423)

It was easily noticeable thanks to Chrome not trusting it in the first place (which also would have prevented spoofing the download server, though I suspect there's more to protect that than just a key).

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