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Re:Alpine Linux 3.15 by masklinn on Wednesday November 24, 2021 @01:01PM (#29332966)
> What is wrong with `sudo vim /etc/foo`?

Aside from forcing vim onto innocent users?

> I feel that it's better than `sudo -e`, but would love to see an example where `sudo -e` is better.

It is way worse than `sudo -e`, because it runs the entire editor as root, whereas `sudo -e` runs a few file copies / move as root. So `sudo -e` has a significantly lower amount of stuff in the "secure zone", and thus, much in the same way `doas` is more secure than `sudo`, `sudo -e` is a lot more secure than running the entire editor.

It also works with anything you can set as $EDITOR.

Some editors (like vscode) will outright refuse to run as root by default.

Re:Alpine Linux 3.15 by dotancohen on Wednesday November 24, 2021 @02:03PM (#29333779)

  > Aside from forcing vim onto innocent users?
Actually, `sudo -e` forces VIM onto innocent users. You are free to `sudo nano` if that's your preference.

  > `sudo -e` runs a few file copies / move as root.
Interesting, thank you, I did not know that the editor is not run as root with -e. So presumably that means that it will have my environment, e.g. will run my .vimrc? Though that could be an attack vector too.
Re:Alpine Linux 3.15 by masklinn on Wednesday November 24, 2021 @02:08PM (#29333839)
> Actually, `sudo -e` forces VIM onto innocent users

No, it does not. It runs whatever EDITOR is set to (technically the first set of SUDO_EDITOR, VISUAL, and EDITOR).

> So presumably that means that it will have my environment, e.g. will run my .vimrc?

That is correct.

> Though that could be an attack vector too.

Only on the specific file, which would usually be a lot more noticeable unless the attack specifically manages to recognise and target sudoedited files while closing the buffer.

Re:Alpine Linux 3.15 by dotancohen on Wednesday November 24, 2021 @02:19PM (#29333986)

  > Only on the specific file, which would usually be a lot more
  > noticeable unless the attack specifically manages to recognise
 > and target sudoedited files while closing the buffer.
I've seen far more sophisticated attacks than that. Though vimscript itself is kind of a barrier to entry ))