But, uh, yeah, turns out that didn't quite work. Turns out when you Silicon Valley tech executives a billion dollars, they don't really think too about long-term business plans. And a billion dollars dries up a lot faster than you think.
But WeWork was 1) not a tech company 2) had no hope of obtaining market dominance 3) wasn't the first mover 4) existed in a market with no network effects 5) wasn't a SaaS company but instead was in a capital intensive business that scaled linearly. No part of the Softbank plan applied here!
> Turns out when you Silicon Valley tech executives a billion dollars
What about when you hand some real estate developers...what did it end up being in the end? $18.5B dollars?
(On a similar note, in other markets - specifically ride hailing - Softbank picked multiple competitors in a single market and funded both sides ensuring no single market leader would emerge. Again, even if the core Softbank strategy would have worked, it can't work when you don't even try and follow it.)
When there is a transaction of this magnitude, normally both parties have duties: the one party has a duty to inform, the other party has a duty to investigate. Here both parties failed, not just one.
WeWork was following a traditional (and valid) business model, but they managed to get Softbank to value them as a tech company. That valuation was unwarranted, and ended up with Softbank losing a ton of money.
Without Softbank's money, WeWork was nothing, but none of those five lessons relate to how to find a deep-pocketed VC willing to give you billions of dollars to grow a low-margin, capital-intensive, non-tech business.
It seems absurd to suggest any of the lessons are applicable outside the the very specific time and place of WeWork's initial growth. "Just be confident you can raise a billion dollars for a bullshit idea and it'll happen" doesn't work if there's nobody handing out billion dollar investments to people with bullshit ideas.