Worth the risk? Probably not.
(a) Since you should be storing your private key on a Yubikey/Nitrokey type device, take it with you wherever you go. To be clear, I'm not advocating doing remote admin tasks from an untrusted computer, but in a desperate situation you could do it from a semi-trusted device with a Yubikey/Nitrokey since it won't be possible to extract the private key (and you can set mandatory Touch + PIN policy on the key to prevent malicious software using the hardware token in the background without your explicit consent). and/or
(b) Implement an SSH CA and use that to generate short-lived emergency keys (e.g. https://smallstep.com/blog/ssh-emergency-access/), someone "back home" could send you a short-lived key in a secure manner.With private/public key pairs, the same scenario would result in the attacker only obtaining your public key, which is useless without the private key.
In general however, I believe that there is no inherit advantage of certificates over passwords, except for the key-size obviously. Everything else is just convention/standards.
Please see the following page that explains better what I meant when I said that the password should be hashed: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hash_chain
Using such a mechanism (including salts / challenges) will prevent an attacker using the hash as the password.
They're really not, they are private/public key pairs.
Now, sure, if you have a public key, and a guess at a private key - you can check if said guessed private key can derive the public key - but unless you know something no one else does - there's no practical way to enumerate and guess the key space.
But a password may be arbitrarily short and eg a random password of 8 mixed-case letters, numbers and some symbol is "just" log2((26*2+10+10)^8) ~ 50 bits (rounded up). Now that's probably not feasible to brute force on-line (without anyone noticing) - but quite feasible off line (if you're patient - but you don't have to be immortal).
I guess I should have said "Public Key Authentication" since that would be more reflective of a desirable baseline SSHD configuration.
The lengthly part that talks about defeating SSH dictionary attacks through some fancy PF rules.
Why, in 2021, is anybody still writing articles talking about using passwords with SSH and saying the way to counter password attacks on SSH is to write firewall rules ?
SSH Certificates are the only method anybody should be implementing these days. Its not difficult to setup or maintain, its nothing put pure laziness that people don't do it.
I would have thought someone writing on an APNIC blog would know better.