It's sad to see that the most detail of the attack we employees of EMC have seen comes from an outside source. The infiltration clearly began by targeting EMC employee(s) not RSA. It's been many months since the attack with nothing being told to the employees whatsoever. I've even heard additional stories about other attempts at social engineering to gain more information recently.
I'll answer questions that I can if anyone is interested but as mentioned above, we really aren't informed ourselves.
To address your first point: I was under the impression seeds were stored for most(all?) customers for "bakcup" purposes. These were taken and matched against SecureID serials for use in more social engineering attacks (getting the other part of the two-factor auth).
The whole post read to me as "meh. We haz hack for months. not impressed".
But they neglected to mention the most sophisticated hacks of the whole incident:
1. cracked the vault/SCM of where the SecrueID token generation algo (generates a pseudo-random number) is stored
2. reverse engineered the SecureId token (ok, not that hard as apparently the crypto allowed regeneration the seed and associated token but still more sophisticated then a Excel/flash exploit)
The whole Excel/Flash exploit was just to get through the patio screen door (equates to the same access an employee has). What was more serious and not mentioned was the attackers cracked the safe in the house.