Re:Backdooring Rust crates for fun and profit
by teddyh on Friday November 19, 2021 @11:38PM
(#29285600)
Describing the current CA system for TLS certificates as the peak of what is currently possible is simply untrue. As it happens, there is a solution, and I described it. Domain names can be tied to a strict key hierarchy using DNSSEC, and DNS for domains can in turn contain PGP keys (or any other kind of verification data). This way, a package could be directly verified as being issued by a current owner of a domain name.
The fact that we all use and trust CA-issued certificates today is not an argument for accepting that system as the best we could ever do in the future, or even today. And the fact that one wishes to improve the current situation does not make it wrong to use the current system as it is – to claim otherwise is to be Mister Gotcha (https://thenib.com/mister-gotcha/).
Again, Internet security is mostly based on trust and there's no way around that: when you enter a URL on a browser, you need to trust that the domain belongs to who you think it belongs, and the only way you have to do that is to trust its TLS certificate... which you do by explicitly trusting your browser to only recognize reliable TLS certificates signed by a legit root certificate authority... unless you decide to whitelist TLS certificates yourself by obtaining the domain's root certificates out-of-band, something nobody seems to think necessary to do, even the most security-conscious government agencies probably go to that kidn of trouble.
Basing package ownership on the same kind of mechanism is the best you can ever do... if you consider that as not being a good enough solution, then you should never use the internet with consumer-grade browsers at all, let alone use package managers in any form.